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I INTRODUCTION 
In New Zealand, around three-quarters of health and disability services are publicly 
funded. 1 The Government's primary objective in providing health and disability 
services is to "improve health status, improve, promote and protect the public health and 
to promote the independence of the people of New Zealand."2 Over $6.2 billion of 
public funding has been allocated to health expenditure for the 1998/99 year to achieve 
this objective.3 This money cannot buy all the health and disability services that New 
Zealanders need. Therefore important decisions must be made about which services 
will receive priority for Government funding. Ensuring that these services are provided 
in an efficient and appropriate manner is also crucial to prevent Government money 
from being wasted. 
The Health Funding Authority (HF A) is the agency responsible for allocating 
Government health funding in New Zealand. One of the HFA's responsibilities is 
managing Government expenditure on pharmaceuticals and related therapeutic products. 
In 1993, PHARMAC4 was established to fulfill this role through the operation of the 
Pharmaceutical Schedule, the list of subsidied pharmaceuticals. PHARMAC has the 
competing responsibilities of striving to attain the best health outcomes for New 
Zealanders whilst also curtailing increasing health spending on pharmaceuticals. 
Assisted by an independent expert body, the Pharmacology and Therapeutics Advice 
Committee, PHARMAC decides which drugs will receive subsidies and what the levels 
of the subsidies will be. PHARMAC uses a "Reference Pricing" system whereby drugs 
are classified into therapeutic groups and subgroups. All the drugs in a given subgroup 
are subsidised at the price of the lowest priced drug in that group. 
1 
Ministry of Health Health Expenditure Trends in New Zealand J 980-97 (Wellington J 998) JO [Health 
Expenditure Trends]. 
2 Ministry of Health Funding Agreement between the Minister of Health and the Health Funding 
Authority for the period J July J 998 to 30 June J 999 (Wellington, J 998) 5. 
3 The Crown The Estimates of Appropriations for the Government of New Zealand for the Year Ending 30 
June 1999 Volume JJ (GP Print, Wellington) 273 . 
4 
PHARMAC's full legal title is the Phannaceutical Management Agency Ltd. In this paper the 
organisation will be referred to as PHARMAC. 
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Although PHARMAC is not directly involved in the market for pharmaceuticals as a 
supplier or a consumer, its activities have a considerable impact on market participants. 
A decision not to list a drug on the Pharmaceutical Schedule can make it extremely 
difficult for that product to compete in the market for that type of therapy as, in the 
absence of a government subsidy, the consumer will have to pay the manufacturer's full 
pnce. PHARMAC also engages in negotiations and enters into deals with drug 
manufacturers concerning the prices and listings of pharmaceuticals. These activities 
may have a damaging effect on competition in various pharmaceutical markets. 
New Zealand's anti-trust or competition law is contained in the Commerce Act 1986 
(the Act) which is "[a]n Act to promote competition in markets within New Zealand".5 
Part II of the Act sets out prohibited practices. These practices essentially involve the 
substantial lessening of competition in a market and using a dominant position in a 
market. However in RMI v PHARMAC, 6 it was held by the High Court, and affirmed by 
the Court of Appeal, that PHARMAC's activities were exempt from Part II of the 
Commerce Act pursuant to section 2 of the Finance Act 1994. 
This paper will examine potential claims which could arise against PHARMAC under 
the Act in the absence of the exemption upheld in RMI v PHARMAC. In particular, 
PHARMAC's ability to substantially lessen competition (section 27) and use its 
dominant position to restrict, prevent, deter or eliminate competitors from the 
pharmaceutical market (section 36) will be discussed. It is probable that claims against 
PHARMAC under section 27 would succeed, although section 36 claims would have to 
overcome difficulties defining the market in which PHARMAC is dominant before 
success is likely. 
The final section of this paper will discuss whether PHARMAC's activities should be 
subject to competition law. Pharmaceutical expenditure management must be examined 
5 Introduction to the Conunerce Act 1986. 
6 Researched Medicines Industry Association of NZ Inc and Independent Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association v Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd and Transitional Health Authority (22 October 
1997) unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 177/95 ; (4 May 1998) unreported, Court of 
Appeal, CA257/97 [RMI v PHARMA CJ. 
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in the context of competing Government objectives: maximising health benefits for 
New Zealanders; controlling public expenditure; and promoting competition in markets 
in New Zealand. The unique nature of pharmaceutical markets and the structure of the 
pharmaceutical industry will be discussed. Models of pharmaceutical management 
systems from other countries will be analysed, however it is found that all management 
schemes have potentially negative implications for competition law. 
Overall, it is submitted that government fiscal and social objectives outweigh the desire 
to promote competition in pharmaceutical markets. It is therefore acceptable for 
PHARMAC to damage competition in drug markets. The extent to which PHARMAC 
may impair competition is constrained by the need to ensure that drug companies 
continue to supply pharmaceuticals to New Zealand. PHARMAC should continue to 
enjoy immunity from the Commerce Act. 
II PHARMAC 
A What is PHARMA C? 
The Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) were established under the Health and 
Disability Services Act 1993 (the HDS Act) as part of reforms to the New Zealand 
public health service. Section 33 of the HDS Act prescribes the two functions of the 
RHAs to be monitoring the need for public and personal health and disability services, 
and purchasing public and personal health and disability services. 
The Crown supplies money to the RHAs by means of a funding agreement which 
specifies the services which the RHAs must provide with the Government funding they 
receive. 7 The funding agreements are re-negotiated annually. The Crown provides the 
RHAs with written notice of its health objectives prior to negotiation of the terms of the 
agreement. 8 
7 Health and Disability Services Act 1993, s 21. 
8 Health and Disability Services Act 1993, s 8. 
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The HDS Act defines health services as including goods, which includes 
pharmaceuticals. The RHAs are "required to decide which medicines and related 
products receive subsidies ... [and]. .. are also responsible for ensuring access to safe, cost 
effective quality medicines to meet reasonable health needs."9 This is an important 
Crown objective that recognises both the significance of pharmacological therapy to the 
health of New Zealanders and the substantial level of health funding which is spent on 
pharmaceuticals. 10 
In 1993, the RHAs jointly established PHARMAC as the agency to undertake the 
RHA's responsibilities in relation to pharmaceuticals. PHARMAC is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the RHAs. It has a small number of highly qualified staff. 11 
Since 1993 the public health service has undergone further reform. The RHAs were 
replaced by the Transitional Health Authority (THA) in 1997 that became the Health 
Funding Authority (HF A) in 1998. Health funding is now undertaken by this single 
central body, although HF A retains four regional offices (Southern, Central, Midland 
and Northern). These structural changes have not impacted on PHARMAC's 
operations. 12 
B What PHARMA C Does 
PHARMAC's two principle objectives are: 13 
9 PHARMAC PHARMAC, The First 20 Months (Wellington, 1995) 6 [The First 20 Months]. The 
Funding Agreements between the RHAs and the Minister of Health set out objectives for the operation of 
pharmaceutical subsidies at length. This statement by PHARMAC succinctly summarises the principle 
prov1s1ons. 
'
0 In 1996/97 $754.1 million was spent on medicaments (largely pharmaceuticals). This represented 
13 .9% of health expenditure in New Zealand for that period. Health Expenditure Trends in New Zealand, 
above n I, 13 . 
11 In 1997, PHARMAC employed sixteen people who together possessed three medical degrees, two 
pharmacy degrees, three science degrees and ten other tertiary qualifications. PHARMAC Annual Review 
for Year Ended JO June 1997 (Wellington, 1997) 20 [Annual Review 1997]. 
12 The RHAs, THA and HFA are considered to be the same body for the purposes of this paper. 
Reference will be made to RHA, THA or HF A depending on the organisational structure at the relevant 
period. PHARMAC is now owned by the HF A. 
13 PHARMAC Statement of Intent for the Year Ending 30 June 1998 (Wellington, 1998) 2 [Statement of 
Intent]. 
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(i) To optimise pharmaceutical's contribution to health status within THA's 
financial constraints. 
(ii) To regularly promulgate accurate information about the listing of 
pharmaceuticals and the conditions under which they are subsided. 
PHARMAC's Operating Policies and Procedures Manual, published in July 1993, was 
developed following extensive consultation with the industry. 14 The manual sets out 
how PHARMAC is to go about its activities in order to achieve its objectives. 
PHARMAC is responsible for the operation of the Pharmaceutical Schedule on behalf 
of the HF A. 15 This involves assessing new drugs, reviewing currently subsidised drugs, 
negotiating with drug suppliers, and providing information about the availability and 
terms of subsidies. 16 PHARMAC's performance is measured by the savings it achieves 
through lowering subsidy expenditure on drugs already listed, offset against costs 
generated by newly listed subsidised drugs. 17 
Every four months 18 PHARMAC publishes the Pharmaceutical Schedule, listing the 
medications and related products subsidised by the HF A. The primary objective of the 
Pharmaceutical Schedule is to "provide prescribers and dispensers with the list of 
subsidised pharmaceuticals that can be prescribed, and the conditions applying to 
them." 19 The manual contains 'decision criteria' to be used by PHARMAC when it is 
making decisions concerning the Pharmaceutical Schedule. These criteria are: 20 
14 The First 20 Months , above n 9, 8. 
15 PHARMAC took over the functions of the Drug Tariff Section of the Department of Health. Prior to 
the establishment of the Pharmaceutical Schedule, the list of govenunent subsidised drugs was known as 
the Drug Tariff. 
16 Statement of Intent, above n 13 , 3. 
17 Statement of Intent, above n 13, 4. PHARMAC achieves savings by working to lower subsidy levels, 
delist drugs and improve drug targeting. 
18 Updates are published monthly. 
19 The First 20 Months, above n 9, 12. Among other things, the Pharmaceutical Schedule specifies: the 
drugs to be subsidised; conditions of supply (for example, quantity and dispensing restrictions); patient 
charges; and prescribing restrictions. 
20 PHARMAC Operating Policies and Procedures of Pharmaceutical Management Agency Limited 
(Wellington, 1993) 7 [ Operating Policies and Procedures]. 
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• the health needs of New Zealanders, 
• the availability and suitability of existing pharmaceutical and other therapies 
to meet these health needs, 
• the clinical benefits, risks and costs of a pharmaceutical, 
• the cost-effectiveness of meeting health needs by purchasing pharmaceutical 
services rather than by purchasing other health care and disability services, 
• the overall budgetary impact of any changes to the Pharmaceutical Schedule, 
• the direct cost of pharmaceuticals to users, 
• any recommendations on core health and disability services made by the 
National Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Services, 
• any other matters that PHARMAC sees fit. 21 
PHARMAC consider these criteria "reflect the natural tensions and conflicts of decision 
making in the health sector. .. [such as]. .. health needs of New Zealanders, the clinical 
benefits and risks of pharmaceuticals, as well as financial considerations."22 It should 
be noted that impact on the pharmaceutical industry does not form part of the decision 
criteria . 23 
PHARMAC receives advice from the Pharmacology and Therapeutics Advisory 
Committee (PT AC). PT AC is a team of independent medical advisors made up of 
medical specialists and general practitioners. Committee members are nominated by 
professional bodies such as the New Zealand Medical Association and the Royal New 
Zealand College of General Practitioners.24 It makes recommendations to PHARMAC 
concerning the medical, pharmacological and therapeutic consequences of amendments 
to the Pharmaceutical Schedule.25 
21 PHARMAC "endeavours to ensure that suppliers are advised of any such ' other matters' and is given 
the opportunity to make submissions on those matters as they relate to a supplier's application to list a 
pharmaceutical on the Pharmaceutical Schedule or otherwise to the listing(s) ofpharmaceutical(s) already 
on the Pharmaceutical Schedule." Operating Policies and Procedures , above n 20, 7. 
22 The First 20 Months , above n 9, 9. 
23 Operating Policies and Procedures, above n 20, 7. 
24 PHARMAC Annual Review for Year Ended 30 June 1995 (Wellington, 1995) 5 [Annual Review 1995]. 
25 Annual Review 1995, above n 24, 5. 
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C Listings on the Pharmaceutical Schedule 
There are six ways in which a pharmaceutical may be listed on the Pharmaceutical 
Schedule:26 
(i) Listed. The drug may be prescribed by any qualified medical practitioner 
(including midwives and dentists in limited cases). Most drugs are in this 
category.27 
(ii) Specialist prescription. Prescriptions may only be written by specialists.28 
(iii) Specialist. General practitioners (GPs) may prescribe the drug on a specialist's 
recommendation. 
(iv) Hospital pharmacy-specialist prescription. Prescriptions may only be written by 
specialists and only dispensed by hospital pharmacies. 
(v) Hospital pharmacy-specialist. GPs may prescribe the drug on a specialist's 
recommendation however only a hospital pharmacy may dispense it. 
(vi) Special Authority. A prescription is subsidised after approval is obtained from 
Health Benefits Limited (HBL).29 Patients must meet the criteria defined in the 
Pharmaceutical Schedule. 
PHARMAC provides these listings to improve targeting of drug funding. This means 
that people's access to particular drugs is targeted towards those who would receive the 
most benefit. For example, some drugs may be more effective for certain people than 
26 Annual Review 1995, above n 24, 4. 
27 
Kyle Jones, Senior Analyst, PHARMAC. Telephone conversation, 21 September 1998. 
28 The Pharmaceutical Schedule contains a definition of "specialist". PHARMAC Pharmaceutical 
Schedule (August 1998) 15 [Pharmaceutical Schedule]. However the general understanding of what 
constitutes a specialist is fairly clear. 
29 
Health Benefits Lin1ited (HBL) is an HF A subsidiary responsible for administering subsidy payments to 
pharmacies. 
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the alternatives available,30 however these drugs may also be more expensive. 
PHARMAC targets the drug at the people who need it by assigning the drug a restrictive 
listing (for example, specialist prescription). PHARMAC considers that a specialist has 
a greater level of knowledge and skill to determine whether the drug is necessary for the 
patient or if a cheaper alternative will suffice. GPs are not necessarily prevented from 
prescribing the drug but are discouraged from doing so as the consumer will have to pay 
the manufacturer's full price. 
D PHARMAC's Decisions 
Decisions concernmg a drug's listing can become necessary for several reasons. 31 
Pharmaceutical companies may apply to have a new drug listed on the Pharmaceutical 
Schedule once they have gained approval from the Ministry of Health to market the drug 
in New Zealand.32 Alternatively, drug companies may apply to have an existing drug 
listed or apply to have a drug's listing reviewed.33 In addition, as PHARMAC 
recognises that the pharmaceuticals industry is dynamic, it regularly undertakes 
Therapeutic Group Reviews. 34 PTAC may also initiative such a review. 
E Reference Pricing 
PHARMAC operates a Reference Pricing system. This is based on categorising 
pharmaceuticals into therapeutic groups and subgroups. Therapeutic groups are sets of 
pharmaceuticals that are used to treat the same or similar conditions. Therapeutic 
3° For example, side effects profiles. Annual Review 1997, above n 11 , 23. 
31 They key types of decisions which PHARMAC makes include: listing a new pharmaceutical; declining 
to list a new pharmaceutical; delisting a pharmaceutical; changing the listing, guidelines or restrictions on 
prescribing and dispensing a currently listed drug; changing the level of subsidy of a pharmaceutical; 
amending the Pharmaceutical Schedule therapeutic groups and subgroups. Katrina Groshinski "Judicial 
Review of Pharmac" (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1996), 14 [Judicial 
Review of Pharrnac]. 
32 Medicines Act 1981. 
33 For example to change the drug's listing from hospital-specialist to general. 
34 Drugs on the subsidy list are appraised within the overall context of PHARMAC's objectives to provide 
cost effective and appropriate drugs for the population's health needs. The First 20 Months, above n 9, 9. 
In 1997, PHARMAC completed three therapeutic group reviews and started two more. Drug companies 
submitted 84 applications for listings or listing changes for PHARMAC's consideration. Fifty five of 
these resulted in a listing. Annual Review 1997, above n 11 , 19. 
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subgroups are sets of pharmaceuticals that produce the same or similar therapeutic 
effects in treating the same or similar conditions.35 All pharmaceuticals in a subgroup 
are subsidised at the level of the lowest priced pharmaceutical in that subgroup. 
Therefore, the lowest priced drug in a subgroup is fully subsidised and free to the 
consumer. However, the consumer must pay the difference between the subsidy and the 
manufacturer's price for the remaining drugs in the subgroup.36 
Subsidies may differ between different subgroups within a therapeutic group. This 
"reflect[s] PHARMAC's willingness to pay for pharmaceuticals which do not produce 
the same or similar therapeutic effect."37 
As the sole agency in New Zealand with the ability to grant subsidies on 
pharmaceuticals, PHARMAC is in a position to exert a significant influence over 
activities in drug markets. Part III of this paper discusses the impact of PHARMAC's 
decisions on competition in New Zealand pharmaceutical markets. 
III PHARMAC AND COMPETITION ISSUES 
Firstly, it is important to note that although the market for pharmaceuticals is often 
referred to as a singular market, it is in fact made up of numerous smaller markets. A 
person suffering from asthma is not in the same market for pharmaceutical therapies as a 
person suffering from arthritis. These two people fall into separate therapeutic groups. 
The markets for different drug therapies may be divided further. For example, some 
people require breath-activated asthma inhalers because they are unable to use manual 
inhalers.38 It is arguable that the therapeutic subgroups, to use PHARMAC's 
terminology, of manual and breath-activated inhalers may be two distinct markets. A 
fuller discussion of market definitions within the pharmaceutical industry will be 
undertaken in Part V of this paper. 
35 The First 20 Months , above n 9, 10. 
36 This is referred to as the "manufacturer's premium". 
37 Operating Policies and Procedures, above n 20, 9. 
38 In particular, children may have difficulty co-ordinating triggering the inhaler with taking a breath. 
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There are several ways in which PHARMAC conducts its activities which may impact 
on the competitiveness in pharmaceutical markets. 
A The Reference Pricing System 
It has been alleged that PHARMAC is able to "control the [pharmaceutical] market via 
its dominant position in being alone in deciding which drugs get subsidies."39 Certainly 
PHARMAC's decision whether or not to list a pharmaceutical on the Pharmaceutical 
Schedule is pivotal to the drug's success in the New Zealand market.4° Consumers 
prefer to receive the drugs and therapies they require at minimal personal cost. 
Therefore, the ability of the manufacturer of an unsubsidised drug to compete with the 
manufacturer of a subsidised drug is extremely limited. By refusing to grant a subsidy 
on a drug, PHARMAC may effectively eliminate that product from the market. 
In addition, restrictive listings may interfere with a drug's ability to compete in the 
market. A drug that is available subsidised only on a special authority or hospital 
pharmacy-specialist prescription, for example, may be unable to compete effectively 
with alternative drugs that have a general listing and are fully subsidised.41 
Reference Pricing may also give nse to competition concerns m respect of the 
classification of drugs. PHARMAC, as discussed above, categorises drugs into 
therapeutic groups and subgroups. However, there is not necessarily consensus that a 
drug has been grouped appropriately.42 For example, SmithKline Beecham disagrees 
with PHARMAC's decision to classify its drug "Serzone" as an SSRI (selective 
serotonin re-uptake inhibitor) , which is a type of mood altering drug or anti-
depressant.43 SmithKline Beecham claims Serzone is "from another technical drug 
39 Alan Woodfield, John Fountain and Pim Borren Money & Medicines (Merck Sharp & Dohme, 
Auckland, l 997) 38 [Money & Medicines]. 
40 Judicial Review of Pharmac, above n 31 , 2. 
41 Around 2,500 drugs and therapeutic products are subsidised. The majority of these have a general 
listing. Statement of Intent, above n 13, 2. 
42 "For many conditions and patients there simply is no medical consensus about equivalence of 
medicines." "Too many bitters pills in Pharmac policy" National Business Review, Auckland, New 
Zealand, 15 May 1998, 38. 
43 Prozac is an SSRI. 
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group"44 and is taking PHARMAC to court over the decision.45 If a drug is incorrectly 
categorised by PHARMAC then it may be subsidised at a lower level than is appropriate 
because the drug against which it is reference priced may be an inferior, cheaper 
alternative. 
B Negotiating with Drug Companies 
PHARMAC frequently negotiates deals with drug companies concerning the listing of 
the companies' products. The most common arrangement is one where PHARMAC 
agrees to list a company's new drug on the condition that the company reduces the price 
of another, already-listed drug.46 PHARMAC's intention is to reduce the reference 
price of the drug subgroup. The price decrease of the already-listed drug will drop 
below the current reference price so that the reference price is reduced. Consequently, 
the manufacturer's premium47 increases for all other drugs in the subgroup. Unless the 
manufacturers of these drugs also reduce their prices, the ability of their products to 
compete against the reference price drug is inhibited. 
These deals assist PHARMAC with achieving its financial objectives, as a lower 
reference price means that PHARMAC is paying a lower subsidy on every drug in that 
therapeutic subgroup. PHARMAC is now examining other ways of reducing costs, 
including sole supply arrangements, preferred supplier arrangements, pay-to-play 
contracts, average daily dose contracts, capped maximum annual contracts, and 
price/volume contracts.48 The first three types of arrangement in this list are aimed at 
reducing drug prices and the last three are directed at risk sharing. 
44 "New anti-depressant may force Prozac price down" Nutionul Business Review, Auckland, New 
Zealand, 15 May 1998, 5. 
45 Drug companies have taken to using judicial review as a means of challenging PHARMAC's decisions. 
However, a recent statement from the courts indicated that this tendency ought to be discouraged. Annual 
Review 1997, above n 11 , 21. Whether judicial review is the appropriate forum for examining 
PHARMAC's decisions is beyond the scope of this paper. 
46 It was precisely this type of arrangement which was the subject of legal proceedings under the 
Commerce Act in RMI v PHARMAC, above n 6. See Part VI of this paper. 
47 The part of the drug ' s price the consumer must pay on partially subsidised drugs. 
48 Annual Review 1997, above n 11 , 23 . 
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1 Sole supply arrangements 
Once a drug's patent expires, there may be several brands of the drug available on the 
market. PHARMAC invites the drug companies to tender for a sole supply agreement 
whereby the tender winner's product will be the only drug in the group on which 
PHARMAC will pay a subsidy. This contract is generally awarded to the lowest priced 
product, but price is not the only factor PHARMAC takes into account. 49 The 
arrangement is usually for a period of three years, thereby effectively preventing other 
drug manufacturers from competing in the relevant drug market for that length of time. 
PHARMAC considers that these arrangements are positive for generic50 manufacturers 
that would otherwise be discouraged from entering the market due to high entry costs. 51 
In addition, generics entering the market face difficulties obtaining market share from 
branded suppliers that have been in the market for many years. PHARMAC may award 
a tender to a drug that is not yet registered, provided the manufacturer obtains Ministry 
of Health registration within a reasonable time. 52 
2 Preferred supplier arrangements 
Preferred supplier arrangements are similar to sole supply contracts but do not have as 
radical an effect on market share. Where a prescription is written generically or there is 
a substitution order53 in place, the pharmacist has a choice which drug to dispense. 
Preferred supplier arrangements oblige a pharmacist to dispense a particular brand 
49 Kyle Jones, Senior Analyst, PHARMAC. Telephone conversation, 10 September 1998. 
50 Generics are copies of proprietary drugs on which the patent has expired. 
51 Obtaining registration from the Minister of Health is a costly exercise. 
52 This is also controversial as the term "reasonable" is open to interpretation. Branded drug 
manufacturers lack certainty about when the subsidy on their product will be withdrawn by PHARMAC, 
although once the tender winner's drug is registered there is generally a three month lead-in time before 
PHARMAC switches the subsidy. Kyle Jones, Senior Analyst, PHARMAC. Telephone conversation, 21 
September 1998. 
53 A substitution order is a letter from a doctor to a pharmacist authorising the pharmacist to dispense any 
brand of the drug even though a particular brand is specified. These orders may be for a specific drug 
only or for all drugs. 
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where there is a choice. The result of the arrangement is that the market will generally 
reduce to two companies: the preferred supplier and the original brand supplier. 54 
The preferred supplier is determined through a competitive tender process in a similar 
manner as sole supply arrangements.55 The preferred supplier receives a fixed subsidy 
on its product for a fixed period of time. PHARMAC is encouraging doctors to allow 
use of preferred suppliers by sending them a form which authorises pharmacists to 
substitute their prescriptions for a preferred supplier product where available. 56 
3 Pay-to-play contracts57 
Some markets are unsuitable for sole supply or preferred supply arrangements. For 
example asthma products are not strictly generic, they are often 'me too' drugs. 58 
However certain drugs have devices associated with them which differentiate the 
products, such as different types of asthma inhalers. PHARMAC recognises that, 
although the active chemical in the inhaler may be the same, it cannot force people to 
use a particular type of device, especially one that may be unsuitable for them. 
PHARMAC also recognises that entry into the market is very expensive and that the 
Ministry of Health imposes rigorous testing requirements for new devices. Without 
alternative products available, there is no incentive for the existing manufacturer to 
lower its prices. 
In order to encourage other companies to enter the market, PHARMAC offers them a 
financial incentive. Two payments are made; a bulk payment59 and a subsidy per unit. 
54 Kyle Jones, Senior Analyst, PHARMA C. Telephone conversation, I O September 1998. 
55 Originally, PHARMAC treated the process in a similar fashion to deciding on a new listing. However, 
this proved to be problematic (and time consuming) and the tender pro~ess is now the general practice. 
56 "Authority to Substitute" forms are also contained in the back of the Pharmaceutical Schedule, above n 
28. 
57 Also known as "two part pricing" . 
58 'Me too ' drugs are products where the molecular structure is altered sufficiently to enable a patent to be 
registered, however they are in fact replications of a patented drug already on the market. ' Me toos' may 
differ slightly from one another, for example in terms of side effect profiles, although their therapeutic 
effects are usually substantially the same. 
59 These payments are not insignificant and represent at least partial reimbursement to the manufacturer of 
the costs incurred obtaining entry to the New Zealand market. A bulk payment to a manufacturer may be 
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PHARMAC must be satisfied that it can subsidise the new product at, or lower than, the 
level of the existing product before it will enter a pay-to-play contract. 
4 Average daily dose contracts 
Drug companies promote higher dose levels because higher volume of sales equates to 
more revenue. These increases are known as "dosage creep". 60 To combat the risk of 
ever-increasing dosage levels, and therefore ever-higher subsidy payments, PHARMAC 
sets an average daily dose level. For example, if the 20mg capsule costs $1.00 and the 
40mg capsule costs $2.00, PHARMAC may set the average daily dose level at $1.50. 
This limits PHARMAC's risk of volume growth "within" a prescription. That is, a 
person's increase in dosage will not result in a higher subsidy payment to the drug 
manufacturer. 
5 Capped maximum annual contracts 
These contracts aim to reduce PHARMAC's risk of volume growth both "within" a 
prescription and "among" prescriptions (the total number of prescriptions written). The 
drug company enters a contract with PHARMAC agreeing that if more than a particular 
amount is expended on a certain product, the company will reimburse PHARMAC the 
excess. These contracts alter the drug companies' incentive away from wanting to sell 
as much product as possible, therefore encouraging more responsible promotion of 
pharmaceutical products. 
PHARMAC considers these arrangements to be crucial to minimising its risk of 
budgetary blowouts, particularly as new drugs are usually more expensive than their 
predecessors. For example, the new anti-depressants such as Prozac are eight to ten 
times more expensive than the old type of anti-depressants. 61 
around $300,000. Kyle Jones, Senior Analyst, PHARMAC. Telephone conversation, 10 September 
1998. 
6° Kyle Jones, Senior Analyst, PHARMAC. Telephone conversation, 10 September 1998. 
61 Kyle Jones, Senior Analyst, PHARMAC. Telephone conversation, I O September 1998. Prozac carrie 
a budget cap. 
15 
6 Price/volume contracts 
PHARMAC observed that once a patent expired on a drug, the prices offered by generic 
manufacturers for the same active chemical were not significantly lower than the 
branded product. For example, generic drugs in New Zealand were only 10-15 per cent 
cheaper than the equivalent branded drug, compared to more often than 50 per cent in 
other countries.62 Price/volume contracts offer drug companies higher volumes for 
lower prices, that is, once the volume reaches a pre-determined level, the price of the 
drug is reduced. 
When these contracts were introduced, PHARMAC was not using sole supply or 
preferred supplier contracts and was therefore unable to deliver the high volumes 
required to fulfill the contracts' objectives. As a result, these contracts have had little 
value for PHARMAC and its use of them has diminished to the extent that they are no 
longer entered into. 
As demonstrated by the above discussion, PHARMAC's activities raise concerns for 
competition in drug markets. In particular, the deals PHARMAC negotiates with drug 
companies may substantially damage competition in individual markets, and sole supply 
contracts effectively form a barrier against entry into a market by other manufacturers 
for three years. Restrictive trade practices such as these would ordinarily be subject to 
proceedings under the Commerce Act 1986. However, pursuant to a recent ruling in the 
Court of Appeal, PHARMAC is exempt from the provisions of Part II of the Act. 
IV PHARMAC'S EXEMPTION FROM THE COMMERCE ACT 
In 1995 and 1996, two pharmaceutical industry representative associations and several 
pharmaceutical supply companies initiated proceedings against PHARMAC.63 The 
plaintiffs' claims included alleged breaches of sections 27 and 36 of the Commerce Act 
1986, together with applications for judicial review. The issue which arose with regard 
62 Kyle Jones, Senior Analyst, PHARMAC. Telephone conversation, 10 September 1998. 
63 RMI v PHARMAC, above n 6. 
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to the Commerce Act causes of action was whether PHARMAC was immune from all 
claims under the Commerce Act pursuant to section 2 of the Finance Act.64 Section 2 
broadly states that the restrictive trade practices provisions of the Commerce Act do not 
apply to the Funding Agreement between PHARMAC and the RHAs and PHARMAC's 
activities under this Agreement. 
It is useful to examine PHARMAC's background with regard to the activities of its 
predecessor, the Drug Tariff Section of the Department of Health, and the Commerce 
Act. Before the 1993 health reforms, the Minister of Health had authority under section 
99 of the Social Security Act 1964 to fix the prices of pharmaceuticals and determine 
which drugs would be included on the Drug Tariff.65 That is, as PHARMAC does now, 
the Minister determined whether a drug would be subsidised and to what level. 66 
The leading case concerning the Drug Tariff and the Commerce Act is Glcixo New 
Zealand Ltd v Attorney-Generaz67 The plaintiff, Glaxo, manufactured an antibiotic 
which was included on the Drug Tariff with a "hospital pharmacy" classification. 
Glaxo's application for a full listing on the Drug Tariff was denied. The plaintiff 
alleged that the Minister was in a dominant position in the New Zealand market for 
general prescription antibiotics and that in exercising her powers under section 99 of the 
Social Security Act the Minister was in breach of section 36 of the Commerce Act. 
The High Court found that the Minister's activities in regulating the prices and subsidies 
of pharmaceuticals pursuant to section 99 of the Social Security Act was not subject to 
the Commerce Act. Firstly, the Minister's activities were exempt from the Commerce 
Act pursuant to section 5 of the Act, which provides an exemption for the Crown 
64 RMI v PHARMAC (HC), above n 6, 3. 
65 Section 99 is set out in full in Appendix 1. 
66 Subsidised pharmaceuticals could be given one of two listings; either a full listing where the subsidy is 
paid when the medication is prescribed by a general practitioner (GP) and dispensed by a pharmacist, or a 
"hospital pharmacy" listing where the subsidy is paid only when the medication is dispensed from a 
hospital pharmacy. Glaxo New Zealand Ltd v Attorney-General [1991] 3 NZLR 129 (HC and CA) 131 
[Glaxo]. 
67 Glaxo, above n 66. 
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provided it is not "engaging in trade" . The Court held that although the Crown's 
activities were affecting trade, the Crown could not be said to be acting in trade. 68 
Although satisfied that the defendant's first submission was made out, Barker J went on 
to consider section 43 of the Act.69 Section 43 provides that the Act does not apply to 
any activity specifically authorised by another Act. Barker J considered that the 
Minister's activities were "specifically authorised" by section 99 of the Social Security 
Act and so were exempt from the Act under this further point.70 
The Court of Appeal upheld Barker J's decision. In respect of the "engaging in trade" 
matter argued by the appellant, Casey J noted that such a definition referred to activity 
of a commercial nature. Although the Minister's decisions may have commercial 
effects, "the activity itself is the exercise of regulatory functions .. .in order to 
achieve . . . social welfare purposes."71 Casey J further agreed with the trial judge as 
regards section 43 of the Commerce Act. That is, even if the Minister was considered to 
be engaging in trade section 43 would make her activities exempt from the Act.72 
Glaxo v Attorney-General established that the former regime for managmg drug 
subsidies, the Drug Tariff Section of the Department of Health, enjoyed immunity from 
the Commerce Act. This issue arose again after the health reforms of 1993, when 
PHARMAC had taken over operation of the Pharmaceutical Schedule, in the case of 
RM! v PHARMAC. 73 
A RMI v PHARMAC (The High Court Decision) 
The case involved three claims that were heard together. 
68 Glaxo (HC), above n 66, 133 . 
69 Glaxo (HC), above n 66, 133 . 
70 Glaxo (HC), above n 66, 134-135. 
71 Glaxo (CA), above n 66, 139-140. 
7? - Glaxo (CA), above n 66, 140. 
73 RMI v PHARMAC, above n 6. 
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(i) The RMI Claim 
This claim essentially centred around PHARMAC's decisions not to list certain 
pharmaceuticals. The plaintiff claimed that PHARMAC (and the RHAs) had a 
dominant position in the market and had been using it to restrict the entry of the 
plaintiffs into and competing in the market (s36 Commerce Act).74 
(ii) H2 Antagonists Claim 
PHARMAC entered an agreement with one manufacturer (the second defendant 
in this proceeding) that it would list a new H2 Antagonist drug if the 
manufacturer reduced the price of its already-listed H2 Antagonist by 40 per cent. 
The reduced price of this drug became the reference price for all H2 Antagonists. 
The plaintiffs claimed that this agreement was in breach of section 36 of the 
Commerce Act.75 
(iii) Calcium Channel Blockers (CCB) Claim 
PHARMAC decided to negotiate with suppliers to reduce the price of CCB 
drugs. It advised the plaintiffs that the subsidy on CCBs was to be reduced and 
that if their prices were not adjusted accordingly, consumers would have to pay 
the difference. The plaintiffs alleged breaches of sections 27 and 36 of the 
Commerce Act. 76 
The issue in the proceeding was not whether these claims under the Commerce Act 
would succeed, but whether PHARMAC enjoys immunity from all claims under the 
Commerce Act. 77 Section 2 of the Finance Act 1994 provides immunity from the 
Commerce Act in limited circumstances. The relevant subsections are as follows: 78 
14 RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 15. 
15 RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 15. 
76 RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 16. 
11 RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 3. 
78 This section replaced s 29 of the Health Reforms (Transitional Provisions) Act 1993 . Section 2 is set 
out in full in Appendix 2. 
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(2) This subsection applies to an agreement (whether reached before or after the 
commencement of this Act) if, and only if, -
(a) At least I party to it was a specified body at the time it was reached; 
and 
(b) It was reached after consultation between the Minister of Health and 
l or more of the parties to it; and 
(c) It relates to pharmaceuticals for which full or part payments may be 
made by l or more specified bodies. 
(3) It is hereby declared that nothing in Part II of the Commerce Act 1986 
applies, or has ever applied, to -
(a) Any agreement to which subsection (2) of this section applies; or 
(b) Any act, matter, or thing, done by any person to give effect to such 
an agreement. 
It is interesting to compare section 2 of the Finance Act with section 99 of the Social 
Security Act which provided PHARMAC's predecessor, the Drug Tariff Section of the 
Department of Health, with immunity from the Commerce Act, as confirmed in the 
Glaxo case.79 The provisions of section 99 of the Social Security Act are significantly 
more specific than section 2 of the Finance Act. Section 99 is entitled "fixing of prices 
for pharmaceutical requirements" and refers specifically to the activities involved in 
operating the Drug Tariff.so Section 2 of the Finance Act is a very general section, 
headed "application of Part II of the Commerce Act 1986 to regional health authorities, 
Public Health Commission, and certain subsidiaries". The majority of the section is 
devoted to setting out definitions of terms such as "agreement" and "specified bodies" 
to assist with interpretation. The only reference to pharmaceuticals is made in section 
2(2)( c) and is still in broad terms: "it relates to pharmaceuticals for which full or part 
payments may be made by 1 or more specified bodies." Read in its entirety, the section 
1s obviously intended to capture only government agreements relating to 
pharmaceuticals. However, if section 2 of the Finance Act was intended to reflect the 
same immunity from the Commerce Act for the reformed health bodies as section 99 of 
the Security Act provided for the Drug Tariff Section, it is difficult to understand why 
section 2 was drafted in such a convoluted manner. This point was noted by Ellis J in 
the first instance decision of the RMI v PHARMAC case.s 1 
79 Section 99 and s 2 are set out in full in Appendices l and 2 respectively. 
8° For examples 99( 1) concerns who is eligible to claim pharmaceutical benefits, terms and conditions the 
Department can impose, and payments. Subsection (2) provides for price fixing, special authorities and 
categorisation of classes of pharmaceuticals. 
81 "The argument before me has highlighted the unfortunate drafting of ss29 and 2,". RMI v Pharmac 
(HC), above n 6, 19. 
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In order to claim immunity under section 2 of the Finance Act, PHARMAC had to first 
show that its Agency Agreement82 with the RHAs was an agreement for the purposes of 
section 2(2), and secondly show that decisions made in relation to the Pharmaceutical 
Schedule were acts, matters or things done to give effect to the Agency Agreement. 
1 The Agency Agreement 
The issue of whether section 2 of the Finance Act was applicable to the Agency 
Agreement relied principally on there being consultation with the Minister of Health 
concerning the Agency Agreement, a requirement of section 2(2)(b ). Ellis J considered 
the intention of Parliament with regard to the section. He found that Parliament clearly 
had the agreements between the RHAs and PHARMAC in mind, and that it intended the 
Minister of Health's involvement to be a prerequisite to exemption. 83 In addition, Ellis 
J considered that Parliament must have also had in mind the exemption that 
PHARMAC's predecessor, the Drug Tariff Section of the Department of Health, had 
enjoyed pursuant to section 99 of the Social Security Act 1964 and confirmed in Glaxo v 
Attorney-General. 84 Ellis J held that there had been sufficient deliberations with the 
Minister of Health concerning the Agency Agreement to satisfy section 2 of the Finance 
Act. 
2 PHARMAC's decisions under the Agency Agreement 
Ellis J then had to consider whether each of PHARMAC's decisions in relation to the 
Pharmaceutical Schedule was exempt from the Commerce Act. The plaintiffs submitted 
that the Act required the Minister be consulted before each decision was made, 
particularly where the decision involved an agreement with someone else, such as a drug 
company.85 Ellis J took the approach that the requirement of consultation existed to 
differentiate decisions of a political nature from those "with a merely commercial 
82 The Agency Agreement is PHARMAC's founding document. It sets out the decision criteria, as 
discussed in Part II above, and PHARMAC's primary objective and obligations. RMI v Pharmac (HC), 
above n 6, 7-9. 
83 RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 13. 
84 G/axo, above n 66. 
8' ) RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 16-17. 
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dimension."86 He considered, after examination of Hansard, that "it is plain that 
Parliament intended that the implementation of major health reforms should not be 
impeded by the Commerce Act."87 His Honour concluded that PHARMAC's decisions 
are clearly of a political nature and therefore these decisions are acts, matters or things 
done to give effect to the Agency Agreement, irrespective of whether a third party, such 
as a drug company, is involved.88 
Ellis J held that section 2 of the Finance Act provided PHARMAC with a complete 
exemption from the Commerce Act 1986. The plaintiffs' claims failed. 
B RMI v PHARMA C (The Court of Appeal Decision) 
The plaintiffs appealed against the ruling of the High Court. Their primary argument in 
the Court of Appeal concerned the requirement of consultation contained in section 2 of 
the Finance Act. It was argued by the appellants that in order to qualify for an 
exemption, the "nature and object of the consultation ... must be related to the 
circumstances which call for it". 89 The appellants submitted there was no evidence that 
the Minister of Health had been consulted specifically about the implications for 
competition law when granting an exemption. 
Gault J, delivering the opinion of the Court, considered that even if the appellants' 
assertion was correct it was not possible to find that the Minister had not given the anti-
competitive implications of the Agency Agreement full consideration. His Honour 
noted that under section 2 it is the Minister of Health who is to be consulted, not the 
Minister of Commerce or Chairman of the Commerce Commission who would be better 
equipped to assess anti-competitive effects. 90 
86 RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 18. 
87 RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 18. 
88 RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 19. 
89 RMI v Pharmac (CA), above n 6, 10. 
90 RMI v Pharmac (CA), above n 6, 13. 
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The Court of Appeal went further still, finding that the Funding Agreements between 
the RHAs and the Crown also satisfied the definitions contained within section 2 of the 
Finance Act. Therefore, the Agency Agreement itself could be viewed as an act, matter 
or thing done pursuant to the Funding Agreements and an exemption from the 
Commerce Act could be obtained in this manner. 
The Court of Appeal therefore affirmed the decision of the High Court and dismissed 
the appellants' claim. 
RMI v PHARMAC confirmed that section 2 of the Finance Act granted PHARMAC an 
exemption from the proceedings brought under the Commerce Act. Therefore, 
following RMI v PHARMAC it would appear that decisions made by PHARMAC 
concerning the Pharmaceutical Schedule are not subject to examination with respect to 
anti-competitive effects. Does the RMI v PHARMAC case in fact represent a blanket 
exemption or is it possible that PHARMAC may still be vulnerable to Commerce Act 
proceedings for some of its activities? 
C A Total Exemption/or PHARMAC? 
As discussed above, PHARMAC had to prove two facts in order to be eligible for 
immunity under section 2 of the Finance Act 1994: 
(i) that the Agency Agreement between PHARMAC and the RHAs was an 
agreement for the purposes of section 2(2) of the Finance Act; and 
(ii) that the decisions PHARMAC made were acts, matters or things done to give 
effect to this Agreement. 
Neither the High Court nor the Court of Appeal had difficulty establishing that the 
Agency Agreement satisfied the requirements of section 2 of the Finance Act. These 
requirements concerned consultation with the Minister of Health during the formulation 
of the Agreement, pursuant to section 2(2)(b ). The issue which raises uncertainty about 
the full extent of the exemption is contained in section 2(3)(b ), which provides an 
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exemption from Part II of the Commerce Act for any "act, matter or thing, done ... to give 
effect to such an agreement." Therefore it is necessary to examine PHARMAC's 
conduct to ascertain whether it was consistent with its obligations under the Agency 
Agreement, the source of its immunity from the Commerce Act. 
Gault J, in the Court of Appeal, stated:
91 
... the effect of the [Finance Act] provisions is to give a broad exemption where Pharmac 
is acting in accordance with the policies and procedures directed by the Minister and 
contained in the Funding Agreements and Agency Agreement. 
It is useful to consider this passage having regard to the comments of Ellis J in the court 
below. His Honour stated that immunity from the Commerce Act was limited to 
activities that were political , rather than commercial, in content and that this proposition 
was supported by the Finance Act's requirement for ministerial consultation.
9
'.! Ellis J 
cited the level of political activity between the drug companies and the Minister as 
evidence of the political nature of PHARMAC's decisions.
93 
In both courts, the nature of the "acts, matters or things, done" was considered to be 
relevant to their exemption. Both courts considered political content to be relevant; 
Ellis J referred directly to the "political arena"
94 and Gault J referred to "policies and 
procedures directed by the Minister".
95 Therefore if it could be proved that 
PHARMAC's activities were commercial rather than political in nature, its conduct may 
be open to examination under the Commerce Act. 
The issue is then whether it is possible for PHARMAC to make a decision concerning 
the pharmaceutical subsidies which could be considered "commercial" rather than 
"political". The focus of the Agency Agreement is upon the achievement of political 
goals: the meeting of health needs and the most effective allocation of Government 
91 RMI v Pharmac (CA), above n 6, 14. 
92 RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 18. 
93 RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 18. 
94 RMI v Pharmac (HC), above n 6, 18. 
95 RMI v Pharmac (CA), above n 6, 14. 
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funding to this purpose.9
6 It is difficult to perceive how any decision PHARMAC 
makes with regard to the Pharmaceutical Schedule could be classified as falling outside 
these political objectives. 
In conclusion it is submitted that, as the interpretation of the Finance Act exemption 
stands after RMI v PHARMAC, any activity that PHARMAC undertakes in relation to 
the Pharmaceutical Schedule is immune from Part II of the Commerce Act. However, 
any other commercial activities PHARMAC is involved with may be open to the 
provisions of the Act. For example, normal business activities such as leasing property 
could not be considered as being within the ambit of administering the Pharmaceutical 
Schedule. Therefore if PHARMAC was engaged in anti-competitive behaviour in 
aspects of its operations other than the Pharmaceutical Schedule, it is possible that 
PHARMAC could be successfully pursued under the Commerce Act. As the focus of 
this paper is on anti-competitive conduct in relation to the listing of pharmaceuticals, it 
is unnecessary to discuss any other activities in which PHARMAC may be involved. 
As noted above, it is accepted that RMI v PHARMAC provides PHARMAC with a 
blanket exemption from Part II of the Commerce Act 1986 in respect of the activities it 
undertakes concerning the Pharmaceutical Schedule. Were this exemption not in place, 
PHARMAC could face a number of proceedings under the Commerce Act, in particular, 
sections 27 and 36 of the Act. These will now be examined in depth. 
V THE COMMERCE ACT 
The Commerce Act is "[a]n act to promote competition m markets within New 
Zealand".97 As discussed in Part III of this paper, PHARMAC's activities give rise to a 
number of concerns for competition in New Zealand pharmaceutical markets. 
Following is an analysis of how claims under the Commerce Act could be framed in the 
absence of the Finance Act exemption. 
96 Key provisions of the Agency Agreement are contained in Appendix 3. 
97 Introduction to the Commerce Act 1986. 
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A Substantially Lessening Competition 
PHARMAC frequently enters into negotiations with drug companies concerning pricing 
and listing of pharmaceuticals. The agreements which are reached as a result may 
breach section 27 of the Commerce Act (the Act) which prohibits contracts, 
arrangements and understandings that substantially lessen competition. Section 27 of 
the Act provides: 
27(1) No person shall enter into a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, 
containing a provision that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect. of 
substantially lessening competition in a market. 
Following is a hypothetical fact situation which will be used to demonstrate how a 
proceeding against PHARMAC could be framed. 98 
Eli Pilly Ltd is a large multi-national drug company which manufactures a wide variety 
of drugs available in New Zealand and around the world. Eli Pilly has produced a new 
asthma drug, Flexibreath, and has applied to PHAR]V!AC to have Flexibreath listed on 
the Pharmaceutical Schedule. PHARMAC has agreed to list Flexibreath on the 
Schedule, provided Eli Pilly reduces the price of its cholesterol-lowering drug, 
Savastatin, by 25%. This price decrease will mean that Savastatin is the lowest priced 
drug in the cholesterol-lowering "statin" therapeutic subgroup, therefore reducing the 
,r, . J . 99 re1 erence price o1 statzns. 
Gallaxo Welldone Ltd's statin, Xpenstatin, was previously the reference price drug in 
this therapeutic group. Gallaxo Welldone claims that the reduced price of Savastatin 
will prevent Gallaxo Welldone from competing effectively in the market for statins. 
98 This hypothetical fact situation is very similar to the second plaintiffs claim in RMI v PHARMAC, 
above n 6, that concerned the listing and reference pricing of a new l-12 Antagonist. 
99 It is important to note that the headings in the Phannaceutical Schedule do not necessarily represent 
therapeutic subgroups. For example, the Ace inhibitors section lists eight different chemical groups, of 
which there are eleven brands. However, the Schedule does not show which drugs are reference priced 
against one another; there may be several therapeutic subgroups within the Ace inhibitors group. See 
Pharmaceutical Schedule, above n 28, 2. For simplicity, in this paper statins have been referred to as a 
therapeutic subgroup although in reality this may not be the case. Statins may be divided into two or more 
therapeutic subgroups depending on which statins have the same or similar therapeutic effect to each 
other. 
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Gallaxo Welldone initiates proceedings against PHARMAC and Eli Pilly under section 
27 of the Act. 
A section 27 claim may be broken down into four elements: contract, arrangement or 
understanding; purpose, effect or likely effect; substantially lessening competition; and 
market. It is important to note that it is not necessary for the parties to the contract, 
arrangement or understanding to be in competition with each other. '00 
1 Contract, arrangement or understanding 
Gallaxo Welldone must prove that there was either a contract, arrangement or 
understanding (CAU) reached between PHARMAC and Eli Pilly. Even in the absence 
of a legally binding contract, given the negotiations that took place between PHARMAC 
and Eli Pilly it should not be difficult to establish the existence of an arrangement or 
understanding between the two parties. It is unlikely that this element would be 
contended by the defendants. 
2 Purpose, effect or likely effect 
Gallaxo Welldone must prove that that the CAU between PHARMAC and Eli Pilly had 
the "purpose, effect or likely effect" of substantially lessening competition. These are 
alternatives so only one of the three must be found. Each term will be examined in tum. 
(a) Purpose 
Section 2(5)(a)(ii) provides that the purpose need not be the sole purpose for the CAU 
but must be a "substantial purpose". Purpose refers to "object or aim". 101 
Gault Jin Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission 102 articulated two important factors 
concemmg 'purpose'. Firstly, his Honour noted that it is the provision in the 
100 Brooker's Gault on Commercial Law (Brookers, Wellington, 1994), para CA27.05 [Gault]. 
101 Gault, above n I 00, para CA27 .11. 
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arrangement, not the parties themselves, that must be shown to have the purpose. 103 
Secondly, the purpose need not be shared by the parties. 104 Therefore it is sufficient that 
the anti-competitive provisions were included for the purposes of only one party to the 
CAU. In addition, although the issue has not been definitively determined, it is most 
likely that "purpose" has an objective meaning under section 27. 105 
PHARMAC's principle objective is to control and, where possible, reduce 
pharmaceutical expenditure. There would be little point in arguing that PHARMAC 
entered the CAU for the purpose of restricting competition between pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. A better argument can be made that Eli Pilly entered the CAU to 
diminish the ability of Eli Pilly's competitors to compete in the market for statins. The 
CAU provides that Eli Pilly's product, Savastatin, will be the reference price drug and, 
as such, the only statin available to consumers fully subsidised. In addition, as the 
reference price for statins has been reduced, the manufacturer' s surcharge on statins will 
increase for all other statins on the pharmaceutical schedule. This will damage the 
capability of other statin manufacturers to compete in the market. Gallaxo Welldone 
can argue that Eli Pilly entered the CAU with a substantial purpose of decreasing 
competition in the market for statins. 
This argument has some force, however Eli Pilly could rebuff the argument by claiming 
that its substantial purpose in entering the CAU was to ensure its asthma product, 
Flexibreath, was listed on the Pharmaceutical Schedule. Increasing the number of 
products available with Government subsidies serves to increase competition as 
consumers are given a greater choice of products at no or low personal cost. While such 
a submission has merit, as noted above, section 27 probably requires an objective 
approach to 'purpose'. It is dubious whether a court would accept that Eli Pilly did not 
have hindering its competitors as an aim when entering the CAU. 
102 [1996] 3 NZLR 554 (CA) [Port Nelson]. 
103 Port Nelson, above n 102, 563 . 
104 Port Nelson, above n I 02, 563 . 
105 Yvonne van Roy Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws (2 ed, CCH, Wellington, 1990) para 
452 [Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws]. 
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Gallaxo Welldone would probably succeed in establishing that substantially lessening 
competition was a purpose of the CAU. However, as section 27 provides for the 
alternative options 'effect or likely effect' to be considered, it would be advisable for 
Gallaxo Welldone to also pursue their claim on these grounds. 
(b) Effect or likely effect 
A finding of 'effect or likely effect' is "a question of fact in each case". 106 'Effect' 
requires proof of the results of the arrangement, whereas 'likely effect' is the 
consideration of results which may happen. Essentially, in order to prove effect, 
Gallaxo Welldone must show a "causal connection" between the CAU and the 
substantial lessening of competition in a market. 107 Gallaxo Welldone must prove that 
competition in the market for statins has been substantially lessened, and that this has 
occurred because of the CAU between PHARMAC and Eli Pilly. It is submitted that if 
Gallaxo Welldone can adduce evidence that competition in the statin market has been 
substantially lessened, it should be able to prove with little difficulty that this is due to 
the CAU. 
In the absence of adequate evidence that competition in the statin market has been 
lessened, Gallaxo Welldone could argue that substantial lessening of competition was a 
'likely effect' of the agreement. Therefore the degree of likelihood is "of primary 
importance". 108 There has been much discussion concerning what constitutes 
'likelihood'. Gault J in Port Nelson defined 'likely' as "a real and substantial risk that 
the stated consequences will happen." 109 'Likely' is therefore more than ' a mere 
possibility' and less than 'more likely than not'. 
As discussed above, the price reduction of the reference price statin drug will result in a 
price increase to the consumer for the other drugs in the statin group. Gallaxo Welldone 
106 Gault, above n l 00, para CA27 .12(1 ). 
107 Gault, above n JOO, para CA27.12(3). 
108 Gault, above n 100, para CA27.13(1) . 
109 Port Nelson , above n I 02, 562. 
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can argue with some force that there is a real possibility that this will reduce the other 
drug companies' ability to compete in the statin market. 
In conclusion, Gallaxo Welldone can make good arguments for establishing purpose, 
effect or likely effect. It is likely that it could successfully prove this element of section 
27. 
3 Market 
Identifying the relevant market is critical to proving a section 27 claim as the market 
provides a context for the analysis of the allegedly anti-competitive behaviour. Section 
3(1A) of the Act defines market as "a market in New Zealand for goods or services as 
well as other goods and services that, as a matter of fact and commercial common sense, 
are substitutable for them." The previous definition of market made no reference to 
substitutability and it appears the amendment was made to "make the relevance of 
economic substitutability explicit." 11 0 However, the High Court in Telecom Corp of NZ 
Ltd v Commerce Commission stated that "reliance upon substitution criteria in a 
contextual vacuum is not sufficient." 111 Therefore when determining the relevant 
market it is necessary to keep in mind the allegedly anti-competitive conduct. 
A three stage test for delineating the relevant market was articulated in Telecom. Firstly, 
the area(s) of close competition are identified. 11 2 Secondly, demand and supply 
substitution is examined; that is, determine "how buyers and sellers would likely react to 
a notional small percentage increase in the price of the products of interest." 11 3 Lastly, 
analyse the product, space, functional and time dimensions of the market. 11 4 
110 Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v Commerce Commission (1991) 3 NZBLC I 02,341 , I 02,361 (HC) 
[Telecom]. 
111 Telecom , above n 110, 102,360. 
112 Telecom , above n 110, 102,362. 
113 Telecom , above n 110, l 02,362. 
11 4 Telecom , above n 110, 102,363 . These last two elements are closely related. The Commerce 
Commission will use a ' ssnip' (small yet significant and non-transitory increase in price) test to determine 
substitutability between products. This test also assists with the determination of the product and 
geographic dimensions of the market. See Michael Pickford "The Economics of Competition Policy" in 
Compliance (New Zealand Commerce Commission, October 1997) 1-4. 
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In light of the above definition, it is immediately apparent that the market concerned in 
Gallaxo Welldone's claim is not what is generally referred to as the 'pharmaceutical 
market'. This blanket term covers all therapies, from insulin to contraceptives to heart 
drugs to anti-depressants. Defining the market this broadly violates the principle of 
substitutability, as different types of therapies cannot be interchanged. 
To refine the market definition, it is convenient to use PHARMAC's pharmaceutical 
categories to express options for the relevant market. Arguments may be made for two 
relevant market definitions: therapeutic group or therapeutic subgroup. 115 
(i) Therapeutic Group 116 
"Lipid modifying agents" are a therapeutic drug group. These drugs work on 
controlling the patient's cholesterol levels. 
(ii) Therapeutic Subgroup 
"Statins" are one of several subgroups within the "lipid modifying agents" 
group. The drugs in these subgroups are considered by PHARMAC to have 
similar therapeutic effects to one another when treating cholesterol levels. 117 
These definitions facilitate an analysis of the substitutability of drugs. It is assumed for 
the purposes of this analysis that the drugs within a subgroup can be substituted for one 
another. Therefore, patients requiring the therapeutic effect of a statin are able to 
transfer reasonably freely between the statins available. 118 
11 5 It is acknowledged that this issue may be further complicated by arguments concerning therapeutic 
effect, for example, where there are arguments about PHARMAC's categorisation of a drug as belonging 
to a particular therapeutic subgroup. See discussion about SSRI drugs in Part III above. For the purposes 
of this analysis it will be assumed that PHARMAC's classification of drugs in the statin group is not in 
dispute by the pharmaceutical companies. 
116 It is possible to categorise a therapeutic group in several ways: by anatomical section (blood and blood 
forming organs); by therapeutic area (lipid modifying agents); by therapeutic type (statins). See 
Pharmaceutical Schedule, above n 28, 50. Therapeutic area has been selected for the purposes of this 
discussion because statins has been classified as the therapeutic subgroup. 
11 7 As noted in footnote 116 above, all the drugs classified in one therapeutic type will not necessarily be 
considered to have the same or similar therapeutic effects. Therefore, there is often more than one 
subgroup in a therapeutic type for the purpo es of reference pricing. For the purposes of this analysis, 
statins have been considered to be one therapeutic group. 
11 8 This includes all statins available in New Zealand, not just those listed on the Pharmaceutical Schedule. 
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Under the three step Telecom analysis set out above, the statins therapeutic subgroup 
satisfies the definition of relevant market: all statins are in an area of close competition 
with each other; demand- and supply-side substitution is likely to occur with a nominal 
change in price; and product, space, functional and time dimensions are adequately 
defined. 
An argument could be made that this definition of the market is too narrow and that the 
relevant market should be delineated by therapeutic group. It is possible that some 
substitution may occur between the different subgroups of lipid modifying agents. This 
position is difficult to accept if it is agreed that only drugs within the same subgroup 
have a similar therapeutic effect. While a patient may be in the market for a drug to 
control cholesterol levels, the effectiveness of the drug they use may be determined by a 
number of factors, for example, the cause of their condition. The drugs are grouped into 
subgroups for a particular reason; their active agents work on the body in different ways. 
Therefore. the product dimension of the drugs prevents drugs in different therapeutic 
groups from being substitutable. 
In consideration of the above arguments, it is most likely that the court would accept the 
relevant market as being the market for statin drugs. 
4 Substantially lessening competition 
This element contains two distinct but interconnected concepts - competition and the 
substantial lessening thereof. Given that the concept of competition is economic it is 
important to resist straying into economic, rather than legal, definitions. Competition is 
defined in section 3(1) as "workable or effective competition." It is also important to 
note that competition refers to competition in a market and not the effect on individual 
. . h' h k 11 9 competitors wit m t at mar et. 
11 9 Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (A uckland Airport) Ltd [ 1987] 2 NZLR 64 7, 671 
(HC). 
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A framework for undertaking an analysis of competition was expounded in Re 
Queensland Co-op Milling Assn Ltd120 and approved in New Zealand in Fisher & 
Paykel v Commerce Commission. 121 The court stated in Re Queensland Co-op Milling 
Assn Ltd: 122 
... effective competition requires both that prices should be flexible reflecting the forces 
of demand and supply and that there should be independent rivalry in all dimensions of 
the price-product-services packages offered to consumers and customers. 
Five elements of market structure were proposed, although barriers to entry could be 
considered the most important. 123 
Competition in the statin market will always be constrained to some degree by the level 
of Government subsidy paid on the product and Government requirements for 
registration of new medicines, which pose substantial barriers to market entry. 
However, even when these factors are taken into account, competition does exist in the 
statin market. Manufacturers are able to set their own prices, having consideration of 
the effect their price decisions will have on the cost of the product to consumers. 
Further, they may engage in promotional and branding activities to bolster market share 
and consumer loyalty. 
Once competition m the market has been established, it is necessary to determine 
whether or not this competition has been or will be substantially lessened by the CAU. 
Section 2(1 A) defines substantial as "real or of substance." It is likely that this meaning 
was adopted from the JUdgment of Deane J in Tillermans Butcheries Pty Ltd v 
Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union. 124 In that case his Honour stated that 
"substantial...includes loss or damage that is, in the circumstances, real or of substance 
and not insubstantial or nominal." 125 The threshold of the test is therefore not 
120 Re Queensland Co-op Milling Assn Ltd (1976) ATPR 17,223 [QCMA]. 
121 [1990] 2 NZLR 731 , 759 (HC) [Fisher & Paykel] . 
122 QCMA , above n 120, 17,245, as quoted in Gault, above n 100, para CA3 . 
123 Gault, above n 100, para CA3.16. 
124 (1979) ATPR 40-138 [Tillermans Butcheries]. 
125 Tillermans Butcheries , above n 124, 18,500. as quoted in Gault, above n 100, para CA27.14. 
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significantly high and may be interpreted as a "desire on the part of Parliament to cast 
the net widely." 126 This position was endorsed by McGechan J in CC v Port Nelson 
Ltd. 127 
It should also be noted that while substantiality requires attention to relative effects, it is 
not a proportional test. Smithers J in Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury 
Marine Pty Ltd128 stated: "it is the degree to which competition has been lessened which 
is critical, not the proportion of that lessening to the whole of the competition which 
exists in the total market." 129 
The lack of precision in the definition of substantial gives the courts a wide discretion to 
determine whether competition has been substantially lessened. Section 3(2) of the Act 
provides that lessening of competition "includes references to the hindering or 
preventing of competition." The inclusion of hindrance in the definition of lessening 
"widens the ambit of section 27" 130 so that the section may capture behaviour that could 
not be strictly considered to be lessening competition, such as preventing competition. 
Smithers J in Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd provided a 
test for determining whether a substantial lessening of competition had occurred: 131 
To my mind one must look at the relevant significant portion of the market, ask oneself 
how and to what extent there would have been competition therein but for the conduct, 
assess what is left and determine whether what has been lost in relation to what would 
have been, is seen to be a substantial lessening of competition... Has competitive trading 
in the market been substantially interfered with? 
The CAU between PHARMAC and Eli Pilly has caused the reference price, and thus the 
Government subsidy, for statins to be lowered. Therefore, unless other manufacturers in 
i 1c - Re Closure of Whakatu and Advanced Works (1987) 2 TCLR 215 ; 1 NZLBC (Com) 104,200, as 
quoted in Gault, above n 100, para CA27 .14. 
127 Port Nelson, above n I 02, 563. 
128 (1982) ATPR40-315 [Dandy Power] . 
J?9 - Dandy Power, above n 128, 43 ,888 . 
130 Gault, above n 100, para CA27.15 . 
131 Dandy Power, above n 128, 43,888. 
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the market reduce the prices of their statins the cost to the consumer of using these 
statins will increase. This puts pressure on these manufacturers to reduce their statin 
prices to prevent loss of market share. It is possible that some manufacturers would be 
forced to exit the market if they are unable to profitably market their statins at a lower 
price. It also follows that potential competitors would be prevented or deterred from 
entering the market for statins if they would have to price their product very low in order 
to compete with Savastatin. 
Further, if Eli Pilly is cross-subsidising, or trading profits on Savastatin for market share 
for Flexibreath, the reference price and therefore the subsidy level would be below cost. 
While below cost pricing does not automatically contravene section 27, it can be used to 
show that the competitive process of the market is being interfered with. 132 
These results constitute effects that substantially lessen competition in the statin market. 
The last critical consideration for proving substantial lessening of competition is that 
section 27 requires a net approach. That is, if the conduct in question has both pro-
competitive and anti-competitive effects on a market then these must be balanced 
against each other to determine whether the net effect promotes or damages competition 
in that market. 133 While dropping prices is usually considered to be pro-competitive 
behaviour, it is arguable that even if some price competition resulted from the lowering 
of the reference price this would be outweighed by the anti-competitive effects of 
increased difficulty in entering or competing in the statin market. 
In conclusion, it is probable that Gallaxo Welldone would succeed with a section 27 
claim against PHARMAC and Eli Pilly. When consideration is given to the other types 
of arrangements PHARMAC enters with drug companies, discussed in Part III of this 
paper, a breach of section 27 is also likely to be upheld in some cases. Sole supply 
arrangements deny subsidies to all drugs in a subgroup other than the tender winning 
product for three years, preventing effective competition in the relevant drug market for 
that period. Preferred supplier arrangements oblige pharmacists to dispense a particular 
132 Port Nelson, above n 102, 571. 
133 Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws, above n 105, para 415. 
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brand of drug where they have a choice. Alternative brands are unable to compete at all 
in these circumstances. Preferred supplier agreements usually result in the market being 
reduced to two companies; the preferred supplier and the original brand supplier - other 
competitors are eliminated from the market. 134 Pay-to-play contracts, where 
PHARMAC makes a bulk payment to a manufacturer to encourage it to enter the 
market, may encourage competition in a market by mitigating a barrier to entry. 135 
However, if a condition of the deal is that the new manufacturer must undercut the 
existing reference price it is possible that a section 27 claim could be made out. 
The risk sharing types of arrangements used by PHARMAC, average daily dose 
contracts and capped maximum annual contracts, may also form grounds for a 
successful section 27 claim. Average daily dose contracts set reimbursement for a 
prescription at a particular level and may discourage drug companies from promoting 
the dispensing of higher dosage preparations. This could dampen competition between 
companies for this range of products. Capped maximum annual contracts provide that 
once PHARMAC has expended a particular amount on a drug within a twelve month 
. period, the drug company must reimburse PHARMAC any further expenditure until the 
year has expired. This prevents the drug company from competing in the market for that 
drug for the remainder of the year after the limit has been passed. It is possible that 
these types of agreements would only affect the competitiveness of one competitor and 
not the market as a whole, however substantial lessening of competition must be 
established on the facts of each case and therefore cannot be precluded. 
In summary, the agreements entered into between PHARMAC and drug companies are 
likely to provide a basis for claims under section 27 as they all potentially have the 
purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. 
134 See discussion in Part III of this paper. 
135 Ministry of Health testing requirements are costly in terms of both time and money. 
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B Use of Dominant Position in a Market 
Section 36 of the Act prohibits the use of a dominant position in a market for proscribed 
purposes. Section 36 provides: 
36(1) No person who has a dominant position is a market shall use that position for 
the purposes of -
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or 
Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive 
conduct in that or in any other market; or 
Eliminating any person from that or any other market. 
The fact situation used above to analyse a claim under section 27 would also provide 
Gallaxo Welldone with grounds for a claim under section 36 of the Act on the basis that 
PHARMAC has used its dominant position to prevent or deter competition in the statin 
market. However, as PHARMAC's principle activity, making decisions with regard to 
listings on the Pharmaceutical Schedule, has potentially anti-competitive effects it is 
interesting to analyse section 36 of the Act in this regard. Once again, a hypothetical 
fact situation is set out below and will be used to demonstrate how a section 36 
proceeding against PHARMAC could be framed. 136 
Dugleast Pharmaceuticals Ltd developed a new "Ace inhibitor "137 drug named Nuopril. 
Nuopril was duly registered for sale in New Zealand under the Medicines Act 1981 and 
Dug/east applied to PHARMAC to have the new drug listed on the Pharmaceutical 
Schedule. PHARMAC decided not to list Nuopril. Without a subsidy on the drug, sales 
of Nuopril will be severely restricted. Nuopril initiates a proceeding against 
PHARMAC under section 36, claiming that PHARMAC is using its dominant position to 
prevent or deter competitive conduct. 
Section 36 can be broken down into three elements: dominant position; the use of that 
position; for one of the proscribed purposes contained in subsections (a)-(c). 
136 This hypothetical fact situation is similar in essence to the Glaxo case, above n 66. 
137 Angioten in Converting Enzyme (ACE) Inhibitors are cardiovascular system drugs taken to control 
blood pressure. As noted in footnote 117 above, there may be several therapeutic subgroups within the 
Ace inhibitors therapeutic type for the purposes of reference pricing. 
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1 Dominant position 
A person in a dominant position is in a position to exercise a dominant influence over 
the market. 138 Dominant influence is considered to mean "an absence of effective 
competition, or an ability to act independently." 139 Before this can be determined it is 
necessary to clearly define the market in which the person is dominant. 
Firstly, it is important to note that section 36 does not require the person to be deterring 
competitive conduct in the market in which it is dominant. Section 36 prohibits a 
dominant person from using its dominant position for anti-competitive purposes in any 
market. 
What is the market in which PHARMAC is dominant? It is not a specific therapeutic 
drug market because PHARMAC is not directly involved in any drug markets. 
PHARMAC makes decisions about subsidies and subsidy levels of drugs in drug 
markets. It has a great deal of influence over activity in these markets, but it is not a 
supplier or a consumer in any drug market. 
PHARMAC administers the Pharmaceutical Schedule. Can the supply and demand for 
Government drug subsidies be considered a market? 140 
The starting point for identifying a market is substitutability, 141 which is an economic 
concept. 142 Substitution encompasses both demand side and supply side decisions and 
examines how buyers and sellers would react to a change in the price of a product. 143 
Given a sufficient price incentive, would buyers switch to another brand (demand-side 
138 A lengthy definition of'dominant influence is contained in s 3(8) of the Act. 
139 Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws, above n I 05 , para 722 . The statutory definition of 
' dominant influence ' is contained ins 3(9) of the Act. 
140 Section 2( I) of the Act defines ' supply' in relation to services as including "provide, grant, or confer" . 
Therefore it is not necessary for there to be consideration in the traditional contract law sense. 
141 The concept of substitutability is articulated in the Act's definition of ' market' in s 3( I A) . Note that a 
discussion of market definition is also contained in Part V(A) above in the section 27 discussion. 
142 Maureen Brunt '"Market Definition' Issues in Australian and New Zealand Trade Practices Litigation" 
in Rex J Ahdar (ed) Competition Law and Policy in New Zealand (Law Book Co, Sydney, 1991), 122 
[Market Definition]. 
143 "Market Definition", above n 142, 129. 
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substitution) or would other suppliers enter the market for a product (supply-side 
substitution)? In this analysis, it is useful to consider the substitutability of product, 
space, function and time dimensions. 144 Product substitutability determines the products 
between which customers and suppliers will switch. Geographic space is the area in 
which sellers will sell and buyers will "shop". 145 Function refers to whether the 
emphasis is on the selling or buying aspect of the market, or on the functional level of a 
market (manufacturing, wholesaling or retailing). 146 In this respect, markets are usually 
confined to only one function although this is not always the case. 147 The time 
dimension concerns "how much time is needed for customers and suppliers to make 
their adjustments in response to economic incentives". 148 
When this analysis is applied to PHARMAC's activities it is not possible to conclude 
that the supply and demand for Government drug subsidies constitutes a market. The 
substitutability test is centered around delineating a market where either other products 
are produced or may potentially be produced. Intrinsic within the substitutability test is 
the element of choice - suppliers can choose to enter or exit a market, customers can 
choose between different products. The emphasis of substitutability is on the level of 
incentive suppliers and customers require in order to undertake the substitution process. 
The product is a Government drug subsidy. Demand or supply side substitution is 
impossible within the product dimension. A subsidy is the only method by which drng 
manufacturers can ensure that their products are either free or cheap to the consumer. 
They cannot switch to another 'product' (subsidy) because there is not one available. 
Therefore there is no demand-side product substitution. 
PHARMAC is the sole supplier of Government drug subsidies. Given that PHARMAC 
was established by the Government's health funding body specifically to fulfill the role 
of administering drug subsidies, it is extremely unlikely that the authority to grant drng 
144 "Market Definition", above n 142, 130. Also sec Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws, 
above n I 05, para 405; and the discussion of relevant market in Telecom, above n 110, I 02,363 . 
145 Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws, above n I 05, para 405. 
146 "Market Definition", above n 142, 130. 
147 Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws, above n I 05, para 405 . 
148 "Market Definition", above n 142, 130. 
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subsidies would be delegated to more than one body. Therefore, there is no potential for 
another supplier to enter the market (supply-side product substitution). 
Further, the aim of managing drug subsidies is to reduce the Government's drug 
expenditure, not to make a profit. Thus it is difficult to see what incentive there would 
be for another supplier to enter the market for drug subsidies. This factor alone removes 
PHARMAC's activities from the realm of economics, the foundation of the 
substitutability test. 
This analysis renders the other dimensions null. PHARMAC is the sole supplier of the 
product in New Zealand so there are no other geographic markets. The product has only 
one functional level. Analysing the time taken for market participants to adjust their 
behaviour is not relevant as it is not possible for any such adjustments to be made. 
In conclusion, utilising the above economic approach taken by the Commerce 
Commission and the courts l49 it is not possible to consider that transactions concerning 
drug subsidies constitute a market. 
However, it is possible the court would not feel constrained to use this analysis to 
determine the existence of a market. It is arguable that the substitution approach is 
necessary only to delineate the parameters of a market where there are substitute goods 
and services available. As there is clearly no substitute for Government drug subsidies, 
an analysis of substitutability is arguably inappropriate. 
In addition, drug subsidies may be distinguished from most other products on the basis 
of their unique nature. Drug subsidies are a political mechanism implemented to 
achieve the social policy objective of enabling consumers to have reasonable access to 
expensive drug therapies. It is arguably artificial and irrelevant to subject the market for 
these subsidies to the strict economic test set out above. 
149 Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws, above n I 05 , para 405 . 
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Is it possible to frame an argument that there is a market for drug subsidies based on a 
common sense approach to the facts? Supply and demand for subsidies exists, even in 
the absence of traditional economic mechanisms such as price. The subsidies have an 
obvious value to all parties concerned. PHARMAC values the subsidies in terms of 
minimising Government payments so fiscal objectives can be achieved. Drug 
companies value the subsidies as they are crucial to the success of companies ' products 
in the drug markets. These parties negotiate with each other over the granting of 
subsidies and subsidy levels in order to achieve their respective financial objectives. 
The absence of competition forms a stumbling block for this argument. The market 
concept is "designed to assist in the analysis of processes of competition and sources of 
market power." 15° Certainly in the context of a section 36 analysis, the potentially anti-
competitive effects of market power lie at the heart of the provision. As the political 
nature of PHARMAC' s authority to grant subsidies precludes PHARMAC from having 
competitors, the argument that there is a market for subsidies is tenuous. 
Whether the courts would follow the economic approach to market definition or adopt a 
more liberal approach is uncertain. However, arguments against the existence of a 
market for Government drug subsidies are persuasive. Obviously if the courts found 
that there was no market for . drug subsidies, Dugleast's section 36 claim would be 
frustrated at this point. Conversely, if a market for drug subsidies was recognised, 
Dugleast would have no difficulty proving PHARMAC, as the sole supplier of 
subsidies, was in a dominant position in that market. 
2 Use that position 
Dugleast must establish that PHARMAC has used its dominant position for a proscribed 
purpose. In Port Nelson , Gault J adopted the Privy Council ' s test from Telecom Corp of 
New Zealand v Clear Communications Ltd' 51 for establishing use: 152 
150 "Market Definition", above n 142, 122. 
151 Telecom, above n I JO. 
152 Port Nelson, above n 102, 577. 
... it cannot be said that a person in a dominant market position 'uses' that position for the 
purposes of s 36 unless [sic sc 'if] he acts in a way which a person not in a dominant 
position but otherwise in the same circumstances would have acted. 
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Therefore, a dominant party acting in the same manner as a non-dominant party cannot 
be said to be using its dominant position. 153 This test may be expressed as a 'but for' 
test. The relevant question is: but for the dominant position, would the person have 
acted in the same way? Unfortunately this test requires the court to guess how a non-
dominant firm would have conducted itself. 154 It is also difficult to separate use from 
purpose when applying the test. 
PHARMAC's political nature strains the construction of this test. It is difficult to 
conceive how PHARMAC would behave if there was another agency with the authority 
to grant Government subsidies on drngs. However, it is intuitively appealing to say that 
PHARMAC has used its dominant position. PHARMAC has the power to deny a 
Government drng subsidy to any applicant; that is the very nature of its dominant 
position. In this context, PHARMAC must have used its dominant position. 
Interestingly it is the Port Nelson case which provides a way for a strict use test to be 
avoided, and for the courts to "use the means they consider best to make the causal 
connection between the conduct and the dominant position." 155 
PHARMAC's unique character may incline the courts to use a more flexible approach to 
establishing use and it is possible that PHARMAC may be found to have used its 
dominant position to deny Dugleast a subsidy. It is submitted that in this case, the 
element of use is not critical as the primary focus is on satisfying one of the proscribed 
purposes. 
153 Gault, above n I 00, para CA36. I l. 
154 Gault, above n 100, para CA36.12. 
155 Gault, above n I 00, para CA 36.12. "While it is not easy to see why use of a dominant position should 
not be determined simply as a question of fact without the need to postulate artificial scenarios, we are 
content in this case to adopt that approach, as did the High Court." Port Nelson, above n I 02, 577. 
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3 Purpose 
Whether use or purpose is the dominant requirement of section 36 has been discussed in 
several cases. Upon the construction of section 36 there is a strong argument to be made 
that use should be viewed as merely a link between dominant position and purpose, 
meaning that the purpose of the conduct is the important issue. This position has 
support in an Australian case concerning section 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974, the 
Australian equivalent to section 36, Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v BHP Co 
Ltd156 and the New Zealand case, Electricity Corporation Ltd v Geotherm Energy 
Ltd. 1s1 
However, the Privy Council has expressed the opposite view and emphasised use to be 
the pivotal issue, with purpose following on. In Telecom Corporation of New Zealand 
Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd, the Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated:158 
If a person has used his dominant position it is hard to imagine a case in which he would 
have done so otherwise than for the purpose of producing an anticompetitive effect; there 
will be no need to use the dominant position in the process of ordinary competition. 
Therefore, it will frequently be legitimate for a court to infer from the defendant ' s use of 
his dominant position that his purpose was to produce the effect in fact produced. 
The Privy Council's use of the terms "hard to imagine" and "infer" indicates that the 
purpose follows use approach to section 36 is not absolute. Dugleast's claim against 
PHARMAC is in fact a case where this inference may not be supported. PHARMAC's 
reasons for engaging in the allegedly anti-competitive conduct have no correlation to the 
proscribed purposes set out in section 36 (discussed below). It is submitted that it is 
PHARMAC's unique position as a tool for pursuing Government health policy and 
fiscal objectives which destroys the inference that purpose follows use. Certainly such 
an inference sits rather more comfortably in ordinary market situations where a 
156 (1989) ATPR 40-925 , 50,010. [Queensland Wire]. " It is these purpose provisions which define what 
uses of market power constitute misuse." 
157 [1992) 2 NZLR 641 , 649 [Geotherm] as quoted in Gault, above n 100, para CA36.08 . 
158 (1994) 5 NZBLC 103,552, 103,565 (PC) [Telecom v Clear]. Emphasis added. 
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dominant party seeks to maximise revenue to itself by undermining the competitiveness 
of its rivals. 
Therefore, even if the use element is satisfied, it is still necessary for Dugleast to 
establish that PHARMAC's purpose for its conduct was one of the proscribed purposes 
contained in section 36(1) of the Act. These purposes are: 159 
(a) restricting entry into a market; 
(b) preventing or deterring competitive conduct in a market; and 
(c) eliminating any person from a market. 
Firstly it is important to note that the relevant market in which to consider anti-
competitive purpose is the market for Dugleast's new drug, Nuopril , not the drug 
subsidy market in which PHARMAC is dominant. 
Secondly, the effect of PHARMAC's acuon 1s not a relevant consideration. 160 
Therefore, Dugleast must argue that PHARMAC declintd to subsidise Nuopril for the 
purpose of damaging competition in the ACE inhibitors market. As PHARMAC's 
principal objectives are to "optimise phannaceutical 's contribution to health status" 
within fiscal constraints, 161 it is these objectives that determine PHARMAC's conduct. 
An argument that the direct and immediate purpose of PHARMAC's decision not to list 
Nuopril was to damage competition in the ACE inhibitor market is not sustainable. 
However, Dugleast may still be able to prove purpose because of the effect of 
PHARMAC's decision. While oblique intention, the intention to do an act known to 
have anti-competitive results, is insufficient to establish anti-competitive purpose, 162 
consideration may be given to circumstances where the effect of anti-competitive 
159 Section 36(1) of the Act. 
160 Gault, above n 100, para CA36.14. 
161 Statement of Intent, above n 13, 2. 
162 Gault, above n 100, para CA36.15. 
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conduct was inseparable from the aim of the conduct. 163 This was considered by Cooke 
Pin NZ Apple & Pear Marketing Board v Apple Fields: 164 
By achieving some degree of fairness [the consequence which was the aim or object of 
the conduct] the levy at the same time inevitably carries out a policy or purpose of 
restricting new production [the inseparable anticompetitive consequence]. 
Dugleast may therefore be able to raise the anti-competitive effect of PHARMAC's 
conduct and argue that this effect cannot be isolated from PHARMAC's purpose. While 
PHARMAC's objective was to, say, minimise subsidy payments and control the public 
pharmaceutical spending budget, the hindering of competitors entering the ACE 
inhibitor market was an anti-competitive consequence inseparable from this objective. 
There is some fore~ in this argument and it is probable that Dugleast could successfully 
argue that PHARMAC had the requisite proscribed purpose on this basis. 
Overall , Dugleast may not be so successful with a section 36 claim. It is possible that 
use and purpose may be found, however establishing the existence of a market in which 
PHARMAC is dominant is a difficult obstacle for Dugleast to overcome. While 
Dugleast may be able to frame an arguable case, it does not have a high chance of 
success with a section 36 claim. Moreover, as the same issue relating to market 
definition will arise in any section 36 claim against PHARMAC, it is possible that even 
without an exemption from the Commerce Act PHARMAC would never face liability 
under section 36 of the Act. 
The above discussion demonstrates two things . Firstly, that PHARMAC's activities 
with respect to operating the Pharmaceutical Schedule give rise to genuine concerns for 
competition in pharmaceutical markets. Secondly, if not for the exemption contained in 
section 2 of the Finance Act 1994, PHARMAC could probably be found to be breaching 
the Commerce Act. Whether or not PHARMAC should enjoy such an exemption is 
discussed in the following section. 
163 Gault, above n I 00, para CA36.15. 
164 [1989] 3 NZLR 158, 162, as quoted Gault, above n 100, para CA36.15(3). 
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VI SHOULD PHARMAC BE EXEMPT FROM THE COMMERCE ACT? 
PHARMAC operates in a complex political environment. The role of government fiscal 
and social policy objectives are central to PHARMAC's activities. In addition, 
PHARMAC's conduct must be viewed in the context of a powerful drug industry and a 
unique market structure. These factors all have influence over whether or not 
PHARMAC should be subject to the restrictive trade practices provisions of the 
Commerce Act. 
A Government Policy 
The role of Government policy making is to balance competing interests for finite 
resources. Containing and, where possible, reducing expenditure on funding priorities is 
desirable as funds will made available for use in other areas. Pharmaceutical 
expenditure is an obvious target for Government cost control initiatives as it represents 
an ever-increasing proportion of Government expenditure on health. i 65 Prior to the 
establishment of PHARMAC, the portion of Government spending used to subsidise 
pharmaceuticals was increasing at a rate that would double every seven years. 
PHARMAC claims it has slowed this growth co the point where doubling of expenditure 
will occur only every 10-12 years. 166 
Containing pharmaceutical expenditure is a significant public policy issue. 167 
Unnecessarily high expenditure and wastage due to over-prescribing or unnecessary 
prescribing diverts Government money from other areas. 168 
165 Intemationally, there has been massive growth in drugs expenditure since the end of World War II . 
World production has doubled since 197 5 and reached [ ! 980]US$ l 50 billion in 1990. Robert Ballance, 
Janos Pogany and Helmut Forstner The World's Pharmaceutical Industries (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 
England, 1992) 3 [The World's Pharmaceutical Industries]. In New Zealand during this period, the 
percentage of GNP spent on pharmaceuticals increased from 0.4% to 0.5%. The World's Pharmaceutical 
Industries, above, 227. A summary of the causes of this growth is contained in Appendix 4. 
166 PHARMAC Annual Review for Year Ending 30 June I 996 (Wellington, 1996) 11 [Annual Review 
1996]. 
167 Peter Davis Managing Medicines (Open University Press, Buckingham, 1997) 97 [Managing 
Medicines]. 
168 Helen Clark, MP "Pharmaceutical Costs and Regulation: From the Minister's Desk" in Peter Davis 
(ed) For Health or Profit (Oxford University Press. Auckland, 1992) 53 ["Costs and Regulation"]. 
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However, there are two further issues that form the background over which the 
Government goal of cost containment must be laid. First is the nature of the product 
itself. There is a wider public interest in drugs than most products and access to 
pharmaceuticals is critical to promoting public health. The value of the product itself is 
the quality and prolonging of life, rather than personal utility. 169 It would be unethical 
for a Government to deny people access to drugs as there is a social benefit in improving 
the health of the general population. Further, there is a public expectation that the 
public health system "must provide regardless of cost wherever there is need." 170 The 
public ' s desire for "free" pharmaceuticals provides a further drive for the Government 
to apply downward pressure to the price of pharmaceuticals. 171 An additional market 
characteristic that distinguishes pharmaceuticals from other products is the complex 
nature of pharmaceuticals which means that the product is selected by a third party, a 
doctor, on behalf.of the consumer. 172 
The second issue is the unique nature of the pharmaceuticals market. The specific 
character of the product as outlined above means that many of the factors which make 
other product markets price competitive are absent. 173 Ma ket mechanisms which 
determine factors such as product range, price and promotional activities for most other 
manufacturers are markedly different for the pharmaceutical industry. In other market , 
competition tends to contain or force down prices. Innovation usually reduces the price 
of technology in other markets, for example electronics, although it has the opposite 
effect in the pharmaceutical market. 174 These features of the pharmaceutical industry 
will be discussed in more depth below. 
As the pharmaceuticals market does not operate and react in the same manner as most 
markets, the Government cannot rely on market forces to deliver budgetary stability.175 
Therefore, if the Government wishes to contain the costs of pharmaceuticals and deliver 
169 Managing Medicines, above n 167, 97. 
170 "Costs and Regulation", above n 168, 69. 
171 "Costs and Regulation", above n 168, 54. 
172 Peter Davis "Pharmaceuticals and Public Policy" in Peter Davis ( ed) For Health or Profit? (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland 1992) 3 [Pharmaceuticals and Public Policy]. 
173 "Pharmaceuticals and Public Policy", above n 172, 3. 
174 Managing Medicines, above n 167, 97. 
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maximum health outcomes to the public, intervention in the pharmaceutical market is 
essential. The Government imperative to control the pharmaceutical budget results in a 
conflict with its role to encourage competition. In order to pursue Government policy 
objectives, it is necessary for PHARMAC to be exempt from the Commerce Act. 
B The Drug Industry 
The international pharmaceutical industry is dominated by a few, very powerful multi-
national firms. Around fifty multi-nationals account for two-thirds of world production 
each year.176 The financial strength of these multi-nationals often exceeds that of many 
governments. 177 In relation to the worldwide pharmaceutical market, New Zealand is 
minuscule. New Zealand accounts for about 0.2 per cent of international drug sales, 
which overall total around $300 billion per annum - about three times the output of New 
Zealand's economy. 178 
While there are many manufacturers in the industry, the pharmaceutical market is highly 
fragrnented. 179 Therefore, competition in individual drug markets is not very vigorous. 
Each market is dominated by a few, efficient, patented drugs that, due to strong product 
branding, tend to remain dominant even after the patent has expired.180 Although it may 
appear at first glance that there are many drug companies involved in competition with 
one another, when the market is analysed in terms of many distinct products and 
markets it can be seen that competition is in fact limited and that market power clearly 
exists. 18 1 
175 Managing Medicines, above n 167, 14- 15. 
176 The World 's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 4. 
177 Alan Klass There 's gold in them thar p ills (Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1975), 43 . 
178 Annual Review 1997, above n 11 , 11. 
179 On average, 21 per cent of the top 25 multi -national companies' earnings come from sales of a single 
product. The World 's Pharmaceutical industries, above n 165, 110. In each market for a particular type 
of drug, generally there will be one or two dominant firms which hold the majority of the market share. 
The World 's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 114. 
180 The World 's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 114. 
181 The World 's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 11 8. 
48 
The Australian Pharmaceutical Industry Commission describes four categories of drugs 
and the varying degrees of competition which exist in the markets for them: 182 
1. unique, breakthrough drugs that are the only effective form of treatment and 
where there is no direct substitute; 
2. drugs that are first in a new therapeutic class with equivalent efficacy to other 
drugs but with quality of life and/or safety improvements; 
3. me-too drugs in the same chemical family with no additional benefits; 
4. out of patent products. 
The pnce effects for each of these categories differs. Breakthrough drugs have a 
monopoly over the market and are able to reap monopoly profits. However, competition 
from other drugs is quick to emerge so companies do not remain in a monopoly position 
for long. 
Drugs in the second category have a more limited monopoly as there is competition 
from drugs with similar therapeutic effects. The third category, 'me too' drugs, by their 
nature are close substitutes for one another. Companies promote these products through 
branding. 
The final category represents generic markets, which are highly competitive. However, 
prices may be maintained at a high level ie order to promote brand image and preserve 
. f 1· 183 consumer perceptions o qua 1ty. 
The key feature of competition in individual drug markets is that competitive conduct 
usually involves innovation and branding, not product price. 184 What is distinctive 
about the pharmaceutical industry is "the extent to which innovation and promotion 
182 The Pharmaceutical Industry Commission Australia Report No. 51 , 3 May 1996, 191 [PICA]. These 
drug ' types' may also be considered as different stages in the lifecycle of a drug as it moves from 
' breakthrough' (if that is the case, it may begin its life as a ' me too ' or a copy ofan existing available 
drug) to generic. See The World's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 206-207, in particular figure 
8.2. 
183 For a full discussion see PICA, above n 182, 192. 
184 "Pharmaceuticals and Public Policy", above n 172, 4. 
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actually substitute for pnce competition." 185 In dynamic markets, research and 
innovation are crucial to success. 186 Mature markets rely on promotion and brand 
loyalty. 187 
I Research and development 
As discussed above, research and development (R&D) is crucial to the drug industry and 
is comparable in this respect to aerospace, electronics and chemical industries.
188 
However, product development has actually slowed down
189 while money spent on 
research by the drug companies continues to increase. 190 
The R&D undertaken by the drug compames has been criticised as being generally 
focused on producing 'me too' drugs, which are then marketed as superior to (and 
therefore more expensive than) the existing drug on the market.
191 This claim is often 
dubious although not necessarily untrue. 192 The search for new drugs may be futled by 
stagnating demand for some products. However, as many new drugs fall into the ' me 
too' category, drug companies have relied on increasing prices to raise the total value of 
sales. 193 
The motivation for drug compames to innovate 1s problematic for health funders 
because there are constantly new products available, some of which are better although 
most of which are not, and almost all are more expensive. However, it cannot be denied 
185 Managing Medicines, above n 167, 96. 
186 "Product development rather than low prices has been the major determinant of market leadership ... in 
industrialised countries." The World's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 60. 
187 The World's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 119. 
188 The World's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 85. 
189 In the period 1961-70, 844 new molecular entities (NMEs) were developed, compared to 665 between 
1971-80, and 506 between 1981-90. The World's Pharmaceutical industries, above n 165, 86. 
190 Managing Medicines, above n 167, 89. 
191 The Food and Drug Administration in the United States undertook a study of348 new drugs introduced 
between 1981-88. It found that only 3 per cent of these drugs had an important potential contribution. 
Thirteen per cent had a most contribution, and a remarkable 84 per cent had little or no potential 
contribution. Ichiro Kawachi and Joel Lexchin "Doctors and the Drug Industry: Therapeutic Information 
or Pharmaceutical Promotion?" in Peter Davis (ed) For Health or Profit (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1992) 245 [Doctors and the Drug Industry). 
192 The World's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 157. 
193 The World's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 29. 
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that drug companies' R&D activities are highly valuable, particularly m light of 
Government objectives for improved health outcomes in the population. 
R&D is often cited by pharmaceutical compames as justification for highly priced 
products. The companies claim that Government policies constraining prices and 
encouraging price competition have the effect of decreasing funds available for R&D.
194 
Therefore not only is the companies' profitability reduced, but the development of new 
breakthrough pharmaceutical treatments is hindered to the detriment of the population. 
While it is agreed that R&D is critical to market success and that it also fulfills a 
valuable social benefit role, it is not necessary to abandon attempts to constrain drug 
prices on these grounds. Even if R&D and marketing is accounted for, drug companies' 
rates of profit are higher than the average for manufacturing industries.
195 It is worth 
noting that in almost all industrialised countries, Government funding for bio-medical 
research exceeds company-financed expenditure. 
196 
While it is recognised that innovation is important to both manufacturers and 
consumers, it should not be used by drug companies as a mechanism through which to 
ensure prices continue to spiral upwards. Were PHARMAC not exempt from the 
Commerce Act, its ability to curtail excessive price increases for drugs would be 
severely inhibited. 
194 Managing Medicines , above n 167, 89. 
195 The World 's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 155 . A study of the US drugs market undertaken 
between 1981-83 by the Office of Technology Assessment in Washington, US, concluded that "the long 
term persistence in the industry as a whole of dollar earnings that are higher than the amount required to 
justify costs and the R&D risk is proof of the unnecessary power of price fixing for ethical pharmaceutical 
products." World Health Organisation Task Force on Health Economics Health Economics, The Uruguay 
Round and Drugs (February 1997) 25 . 
196 The World's Pharmaceutical Industries , above n 165, 90. These countries are Ireland, Japan, 
Switzerland and the UK. New Zealand generally produces only finished products, usually from imported 
inputs. However, it has limited research capabilities and has invented one NME in total. 
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2 Promotion 
Drug compames spend around 20 per cent of the wholesale pnce of a drug on 
k · h d I f f: · 197 mar etmg, t e secon argest expense a ter manu actunng. In addition, drug 
compames sponsor events such as conferences for doctors and undertake "indirect" 
promotion, that is the giving of gifts and merchandise to doctors. 
Drug companies claim that their promotional materials and activities provide "essential 
information to physicians and other choice-makers." 198 However, critics claim that the 
objective of promotion is to support higher prices and increased market power for the 
drug companies. Certainly, the drug companies spend excessive amounts of their 
revenue on promotional activities. 199 
The role of marketing and promotion 1s to differentiate products and maintain the 
loyalty of the choice-maker.200 The emphasis is on "product differentiation backed up 
by scientific claims of efficacy, and the target is the prescribing clinician."
20
i Fierce 
promotion may be associated with the launch of a 'me too' product which differs very 
little from already available products.202 The manufacturer will promote the brand of 
their product to encourage doctors to prescribe it over other, virtually identical, 
products. 
Promotional activities do indeed have a significant impact on doctors' prescribing 
habits. The most obvious indication of this is the level of promotion which takes place; 
drug companies would soon abandon such expensive operations if they were not 
effective. 
197 Managing Medicines, above n 167, 94. 
198 The World's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 159. 
199 A 1991 study undertaken in New Zealand showed that "drug companies spent over $500,000 in 
postage alone to send out 30 tons of print advertising to doctors." Annual Review 1997, above n 11 , 7. In 
the US, promotional expenditure is equal to total sales of the new product in its first year, 50% in the 
second year and 25% in the third year. The World 's Pharmaceutical Industries , above n 165, 160. 
200 Managing Medicines , above n 167, 92. 
20 1 Managing Medicines , above n 167, 94. 
202 "Doctors and the Drug Industry". above n 191 ,245. 
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The major implication of promotional activities for Government drug expenditure is that 
doctors may be encouraged to prescribe more expensive drugs over equivalents that may 
be cheaper yet the same or similar in effect. In addition, excessive promotional activity 
may lead to over-prescribing of drugs, increasing Government spending. PHARMAC's 
exemption from the Commerce Act enables PHARMAC to curtail expensive or over-
prescribing by selecting which drugs will be subsidised and limiting total expenditure on 
a particular drug. 
C Government Alternatives 
The above discussion has highlighted the unique nature of pharmaceutical products and 
the pharmaceutical industry, and the problems a government faces in seeking to 
minimise its health spending on pharmaceuticals. Given the competition law issues 
arising from PHARMAC's operation of a reference pricing system, what policy 
alternatives are available? Are any of these alternatives acceptable under the provisions 
of the Commerce Act? 
One option is to allow natural price competition to bring down the prices of drugs once 
patents have expired and generics have entered the market. 
203 Obviously this requires 
Governments to endure substantial periods where patent protection is available
204 and 
price competition is virtually absent from the market. A further difficulty is that, as 
noted above, there is no guarantee that price competition will occur once a patent has 
expired and generics are available. This is due to the intense branding and promotional 
activities undertaken by the branded drug manufacturers. Also, as market entry is 
difficult, sufficient generics may not be available to provide a truly competitive 
environment. In light of the Government's objective of controlling an escalating drugs 
bill, this option is unsatisfactory. 
203 The World's Pharmaceutical Industries , above n 165, 207. 
204 A period of 16 years in New Zealand. 
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It is accepted that the Government must undertake some form of regulation of the drug 
industry in order to protect its fiscal interests. What are governments in other countries 
doing, and what implications do these schemes have for competition? 
1 Drug market regulation overseas 
Although methods differ, almost all Governments regulate drug prices.
205 In its 1996 
Annual Review, PHARMAC discussed measures other countries had undertaken in the 
previous year to reduce their expenditure on pharmaceuticals.
206 For example, Denmark 
reduced antibiotic subsidies and negotiated price agreements with drug companies. 
France set a price ceiling on growth in expenditure generated by non-hospital doctors. 
Holland cut drug prices to the average of Belgium, France, Germany and the UK. Italy 
implemented a reference pricing system. Kenya introduced generic substitution. 
There are three ways a Government can set about containing the cost of 
pharmaceuticals. It can put a ceiling on drug expenditure, make the drug products 
h "d · d 207 c eaper, or avo1 excessive an unnecessary use. The methods of containing 
pharmaceutical costs vary greatly in different countries and often er.:iploy a combination 
of all three methods noted above. One commentator identifies seven schemes used by 
. G I h . 1 . 20s vanous overnments to regu ate p armaceutica pnces. 
(i) Direct Price Regulation 
a) Italy has used international prices as a basis for setting domestic prices 
since 1991. 209 
205 The World's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 141. 
206 Annual Review 1996, above n 166, 11-12. 
207 FM Haaijer-Ruskamp, NMG Dukes Drugs and Money: The problem of Cost Containment (6 ed, Styx 
Publications, Groningen, 1991) 15 [ Drugs and Money]. 
208 Patricia M Danzon Pharmaceutical Price Regulation (AEI Press, Washington DC, 1997) 16-29 
[Pharmaceutical Price Regulation]. Danzon also discusses the US model , however the US system is 
fundamentally different from most other countries as Government spending accounts for only around 2 per 
cent of expenditure on phannaceuticals (The World 's Pharmaceutical Industries , above n 165, 149). 
Therefore the US system has not been discussed. 
209 Comparisons with prices in other countries have problems which must be kept in mind. Using drug 
expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure is coloured by costs and availability of other forms 
of medical care in each country. Drug expenditure as a percentage of GNP takes no account of different 
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b) France uses several criteria for setting prices (international comparisons 
with existing products; therapeutic merit; contribution to the domestic 
economy). In 1994 France added revenue limits to its scheme. 
c) Canada benchmarks innovative products against their prices in nine other 
countries. Prices for non-innovative products are "tied" to their existing 
levels. 
(ii) Revenue Limits 
The Government sets the budget for drug expenditure and then negotiates a 
"firm-specific limit" on each manufacturer's sales. If this budget is exceeded, 
the firm must reduce its prices. This is incorporated into France's scheme. 
(iii) Reference Pricing 
German, the Netherlands, Denmark, New Zealand and British Columbia.
210 
Although this commentator does not specifically identify Australia, Australia's 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme is based on reference pricing principles. 
(iv) Rate of Return 
The UK operates a Pharmaceutical Price Registration Scheme (PPRS) which 
regulates profits instead of prices. Companies are free to set their own prices for 
new products, provided their rate of return on capital from subsidised products 
does not exceed a limit set by the National Health Service. While this system 
addresses concerns about R&D investments not being adequately accounted for 
with other systems (such as reference pricing), it has the unfortunate effect of 
stimulating creative accounting practices. As a result, regulations have become 
increasingly complex. 
standards of living among countries, and drug expenditure per inhabitant is distorted by exchange rate 
fluctuations. See discussion in Drugs and Money, above n 207, 7-9 . 
2 10 Other Canadian states operate different schemes, however these are quite closely related to reference 
pricing. For example, Ontario uses a Best Available Price (BAP) system. See Money and Medicines, 
above n 39, 194-197, for full discussion. 
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(v) Physician Drug Budgets 
In Germany, the first 280 million deutsche marks over the drug budget is taken 
from the physician budget for the next year and the next 280 million deutsche 
marks are charged to the drug manufacturers. The scheme is intended to 
discourage doctors from using the writing of prescriptions or repeat prescriptions 
as a way of increasing patient visits (to bolster their revenue). 
(vi) The Japanese System 
In Japan, most doctors also dispense drugs . Therefore, as they receive the 
Government reimbursement paid on the drug, any difference between the 
reimbursement and the manufacturer ' s price is theirs. Manufacturers seek to 
reduce their prices below the reimbursement level so that doctors have more 
incentive to subscribe the company's product. The Government surveys and 
reviews drug reimbursement levels every two years. 
(vii) Patient Copayments 
Cost sharing mechanisms are common in many European countries. They have 
historically been of little significance, mainly due to numerous exemptions 
available. Italy and Germany have recently increased copayment levels in an 
effort to make them a more effective deterrent to over-prescribing. Theoretically 
the copayments should be proportional to the drug ' s cost, and have an upper 
limit which is adjusted according to the income of the patient. 
What are the competition implications of these alternatives schemes? Arguably 
wherever there is some Government intervention into the natural mechanisms of the 
marketplace there is an impact on competition, even if the intervention is not directly on 
pnces. 
Methods of price control, price regulation and revenue limits,2
11 remove the ability of 
companies to set their own prices, affecting price competition in drug markets . 
211 Revenue limits are a price control mechanism as they force firms to lower their prices once a 
predetermined threshold is reached. 
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Therefore the use of direct price controls m ew Zealand would be likely to have 
implications for competition law. 
Alternative methods which seek to avoid excessive use of pharmaceuticals, such as 
Germany's physician drug budget, the Japanese scheme, and patient copayment 
schemes, arguably have less impact on competition in pharmaceutical markets. Drug 
companies are free to set their prices and undertake promotional activities, although they 
are motivated to keep prices down in order to encourage doctors to prescribe their 
products. The German and Japanese schemes both revolve around the unique character 
of their respective public health systems. In Germany, the disincentive for doctors to 
over-prescribe is based on a potential reduction of the physician budget. As doctor's 
visits are not subsidised in ew Zealand, the Government is unable to apply pressure on 
doctors in this manner.212 The Japanese system is fundamentally different from ew 
Zealand because in Japan doctors, rather than pharmacists, dispense drugs. This scheme 
cannot be easily translated into the ew Zealand situation. In any case, it is likely that 
both these schemes would also have implications for competition law in a similar 
fashion to PHARMAC's nsk-reducing contracts discussed in Part III above. 
Patient copayment schemes give drug companies the freedom to determine their prices 
and promotional activities, and rely on consumer demand for low cost drugs to control 
government pharmaceutical expenditure. However, these schemes arguably do not go 
far enough towards controlling the government drug budget. The proportional 
reimbursement mechanism means that expensive drugs are proportionately dearer to the 
consumer. Depending on the price differentials between alternative products, there may 
not be sufficient incentive for consumers, and doctors, to select the cheaper drug. In 
addition proportionality means that the subsidy levels on more expensive drugs are 
higher also, which increases the cost to the government. It is no doubt for these reasons 
21 2 In New Zealand, people on low incomes or who must visit a doctor frequently may qualify for a 
Government subsidy on GP visits. However, no subsidies are generally available. 
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that patient copayment schemes are usually operated in conjunction with other methods 
of budgetary control. 213 
The United Kingdom's rate of return scheme allows drug manufacturers to have a great 
deal of control over their operations. By determining the rate of return that is acceptable 
for drug companies, the scheme targets companies that are overpricing their products by 
focusing on excessive profits reaped in the industry. The R&D investments made by the 
drug companies are also recognised. This scheme enables the Government to foster 
price competition in drug markets. However, as noted above, administering the scheme 
is highly complex. Further, a small and relatively insignificant consumer such as New 
Zealand would be likely to encounter difficulties operating a rate of return scheme with 
the co-operation of powerful multi-national drug companies. 
Finally, there is reference pncmg. In principle, reference pncmg may encourage 
competition between drugs priced above the reference price because drug companies 
h · · · 214 ave an mcent1vc to compete on pnce. There is also a disincentive for drug 
companies to saturate the market with 'me toos' as these are unlikely to be granted 
subsidies. However, as the discussion in Part V of this paper demonstrates, 
PHARMAC's operation of reference pricing in New Zealand would be the basis of 
claims under the Commerce Act were it not for the exemption contained in section 2 of 
the Finance Act. 
2 Reference pricing and competition 
It is accepted that the Government's fiscal objective to contain public expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals has precedence over its desire to promote competition in New Zealand 
markets. The above discussion indicates that alternatives to reference pricing feasible 
for New Zealand would also have implications for competition law. Reference pricing 
has been selected as the mechanism for controlling Government expenditure on 
213 Many European countries, including the United Kingdom, operate patient copayment schemes in 
addition to other methods of pharmaceutical budget control. Sec "Pharmaceutical Price Regulation" 
above n 208, 27-28. 
214 "Pharmaceutical Price Regulation", above n 208, 19. 
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pharmaceuticals. The issue is therefore to what extent the fiscal priority should have 
precedence over competition concerns. It is necessary, with the provisions of the 
Commerce Act aside, to analyse what is the true effect of PHARMAC's reference 
pricing scheme on the competitiveness of drng companies. 
PHARMAC's position, unsurprisingly, is that reference pncmg actually enhances 
competition in the markets for drngs. It states:
215 
Reference pricing .. . reduces the excessive market segmentation based on brand marketing 
that allowed suppliers to establish markets that were free from price competition. 
Reference pricing brings price competition back into the pharmaceutical market. 
The position that reference pricing type schemes are not damaging to competition 1s 
supported by the Pharmaceutical Industry Commission of Australia. The Commission 
found that the pharmaceutical markets in Australia are competitive, despite the 
operation of the Australia's Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.
21 6 
The drng industry perspective is that reference pricing type systems suppress prices.
217 
The Researched Medicines Industry of New Zealand (RMI) considers that reference 
pricing enables PHARMAC to coerce drug companies into agreements they would 
otherwise not consider.21
8 In addition, PHARMAC effectively controls entry to the 
New Zealand market.219 This raises the concern that the availability of some drugs may 
be reduced if manufacturers choose not to market their drngs in a price-suppressed 
215 The First 20 Months, above n 9, 10. 
216 The Pharmaceutical Industry Commission Australia noted that in competitive markets, revenue and 
costs are closely related. If sales revenue is reduced by, for example, the operation of the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme, production costs may not be covered and the companies ' operations will become 
unsustainable leading to a loss of efficient activity in the market. In contrast, in markets where companies 
have significant market power, revenue will be sufficiently higher than costs and the effect of lowering 
revenue (within limits) will be to reduce profits, not production. Therefore there will be little effect on 
efficient activity in the market. Efficient activity evident in the Australian market led the Pharmaceutical 
Industry Commission to conclude that the market was competitive. PICA, above n 182, 322. 
21 7 PICA, above n 182, 192. In a Bureau oflndustry Economics (Australia) survey of company 
perceptions undertaken in 1991 and again in 1995, 80 per cent of drug companies indicated that they 
thought their drug prices would be higher in a deregulated environment. 
218 Terence Aschoff, Manager, of the Researched Medicines Industry Association (RMI). Telephone 
conversation, 16 September 1998. 
219 Terence Aschoff, Manager, of the Researched Medicines Industry Association (RMI). Telephone 
conversation, 16 September 1998. 
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market.
220 
The argument is that if a country's price regulations are too restrictive, drug 
companies will simply exit the market, leaving the population without a supply of 
pharmaceuticals it may need. 
The counter-argument is that the selection of drugs available is so broad that 
considerable limitations can be imposed on this range without any real threat to the 
patients' therapeutic interests.
221 To what extent is this proposition is supportable is 
dubious. In a market the size of New Zealand, one drug company's decision to 
withdraw supply is a possibility that could have a potentially disastrous impact on 
achieving health objectives through pharmaceutical therapy. 
In light of New Zealand's position as a very small player in a very large market, it is 
doubtful that PHARMAC is able to wield excessive power over the drug companies. 
There are certainly examples of drug companies withdrawing products from the New 
Zealand market, although whether the loss of particular products has an unduly adverse 
effect on the population· s health requirements is uncertain. 
222 Whether the therapeutic 
benefit of a particular drug should be differentiated from other similar drugs will always 
be a contentious medical issue relevant to the adequacy of the range of drugs avc1ilable. 
as well as to reference pricing. 
When the New Zealand market is examined in scale to the international drug industry it 
may be concluded that PHARMAC's activities are self-regulating. If a decision in 
relation to the Pharmaceutical Schedule is crippling to a drug manufacturer, that 
manufacturer may simply elect to cease supply to the New Zealand market. While 
220 PICA, above n 182, 21 7. 
221 Drugs and Money, above n 207, 35 . 
222 The patent on Zovirax, an anti-viral dmg used to treat genital herpes, has expired and as a re ult its 
price has been reduced by 50 per cent. The reference price for this therapeutic subgroup will decrease 
accordingly on l October 1998. Valtrex is another anti-viral dmg in the same subgroup as Zovirax and 
the lower subsidy level will result in consumers having to pay a manufacturer's surcharge of between $30 
and $60 per prescription. Valtrex (and Zovirax) manufacturer, Glaxo Wellcome, said this would 
effectively stop people from using the drug and has withdrawn Valtrex from the New Zealand market. 
"Pharmac blamed over dmg move" Dominion , Wellington, New Zealand, 14 September 1998. The 
material difference between the two drugs is that Valtrex need only be taken twice a day whereas Zovirax 
must be taken five times daily at regular intervals. PHARMAC considers this small advantage is 
outweighed by the $7.5 million in savings PHARMAC will achieve through the reduced subsidy level on 
these drugs. Kyle Jones, Senior Analyst, PHARMAC. Telephone conversation, 21 September l 998 . 
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PHARMAC's decision criteria do not include impact on the pharmaceutical industry as 
a consideration, the availability and suitability of pharmaceuticals to meet New 
Zealander's health needs is a specific decision criterion. Therefore if the result of a 
PHARMAC decision was likely to be that New Zealanders would lose access to an 
important drug therapy, PHARMAC would have to take this matter into account. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Providing publicly funded pharmaceutical therapies is a task for Government that 
involves three competing objectives: maximising health benefits for New Zealanders; 
controlling public expenditure; and promoting competition in markets in New Zealand. 
PHARMAC is able to assert broad powers over drug companies and their ability to 
compete in New Zealand markets. In the absence of an exemption from the Commerce 
Act pursuant to section 2 of the Finance Act, PHARMAC would face claims 0f 
restrictive trade practices under the Act. 
It is accepted that, against the public policy background of pharmaceutical markets, the 
Government's priority is cost effective provision of pharmaceuticals to meet the 
population's health needs . In this context, some negative impact on competition in 
pharmaceutical markets is acceptable. 
Ultimately, PHARMAC's anti-competitive behaviour is self-regulating because it 
cannot allow suppliers of essential pharmaceutical therapies to exit the New Zealand 
market. In the event that drug companies were ceasing to supply such pharmaceuticals, 
this proposition would have to be reassessed. However even with regard to anti-
competitive conduct which, but for PHARMAC's exemption, would be captured by the 
Commerce Act, competition in New Zealand drug markets is not being damaged to the 
extent that manufacturers are withdrawing supply and the Government's health 
objectives are being compromised. 
PHARMAC's exemption from the Commerce Act must be preserved to enable the 
Government's fiscal and health policy objectives to be pursued. 
APPENDIX ONE 
SECTION 99 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1964223 
99. Fixing of prices for pharmaceutical requirements - (1) The Minister may 
from time to time, by direction, specify all or any of the following matters: 
(a) The medicines, drugs, appliances, and things in respect of which the 
Department will make payments to persons who supply them to -
(i) Persons entitled to claim and claiming pharmaceutical benefits; or 
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(ii) Any other persons for supply in the course of the rendering of a service by 
those other persons that is the subject of any other benefit provided for by the Part of 
this Act to persons so entitled and so claiming: 
(b) Any terms and conditions that must be complied with before the Department will make 
payments in respect of pharmaceutical requirements, or make payments at a particular 
rate in respect of pharmaceutical requirements, as aforesaid: 
(c) The payments to be made as aforesaid for pharmaceutical requirements. 
(2) Any direction under subsection (1) of this section may -
(a) Fix the prices to be paid by the Department directly, or by reference to prices outside 
the control of the Minister, or in any other manner that the Minister sees fit, or by a 
combination of any 2 or more of such methods of calculation: 
(c) In the case of pharmaceutiral requirements supplied to persons for the purpose of 
enabling them to supply those requirements to other persons, specify or describe the 
persons to whom any such payment shall be made: 
(_d) Be a general direction, relating to pharmaceutical requirements supplied to any person 
claiming pharmaceutical benefits, or a special direction relating to specified 
pharmaceutical requirements or a specified class of pharmaceutical requirements 
supplied to a specified person or to a specified class of person: 
( e) Make, in the case of a general direction, different provision for different 
pharmaceutical requirements or classes of pharmaceutical requirements, or for different 
classes of person supplying pharmaceutical requirements, or for different classes of 
person for whom pharmaceutical requirements are supplied. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall limit or affect the provisions of sections 117, 118, 123, or 
132 of this Act. 
223 Section 99 appears as reproduced in G/axo, above n 66, 131 , as s 99 was repealed by s 24(1) of the 
Health Reforms Act 1993 . 
APPENDIX TWO 
SECTION 2 FINANCE ACT 1994 
2. Application of Part II of Commerce Act 1986 to regional health 
authorities, Public Health Commission, and certain subsidiaries - (1) In this 
section, unless the context otherwise requires, -
"Agreement" -
(a) Includes any agreement, arrangement, contract, covenant, deed, or 
understanding, whether oral or written, whether express or implied, and 
whether or not enforceable at law; and 
(b) Without limiting the generality of paragraph (a) of this definition, 
includes any contract of service and any agreement, arrangement, contract, 
covenant, or deed, creating or evidencing a trust: 
"Authority" means a regional health authority established by Order in Council in 
accordance with section 32 of the Health and Disability Services Act 1993: 
"The commission" means the Public Health Commission established by section 27 of 
the Health and Disability Services Act 1993: 
"Pharmaceuticals" manes substances or things that are medicines, therapeutic medical 
devices, or products or things related to pharmaceuticals: 
"Reached" includes entered into, granted, and made; and "reaching" has a 
corresponding meaning: 
" Specified body" means a body that is an authority, the commission, or any person 
wholly owned by a specified body or 2 or more specified bodies: 
"Subsidiary" has the meaning given to that term by section 1.58 of the Companies Act 
1995 or, as the case may require, sections 5 and 6 of the Companies Act 1993. 
(2) This subsection applies to an agreement (whether reached before or after the 
commencement of this Act) if, and only if, -
(a) At least 1 party to it was a specified body at the time it was reached; 
and 
(b) It was reached after consultation between the Minister of Health and l 
or more of the parties to it; and 
( c) It relates to pharmaceuticals for which full or part payments may be 
made by 1 or more specified bodies. 
(3) It is hereby declared that nothing in Part II of the Commerce Act 1986 applies, 
or has ever applied, to -
(a) Any agreement to which subsection (2) of this section applies; or 
(b) Any act, matter, or thing, done by any person to give effect to such an 
agreement. 
( 4) For the purposes of section 2(7) of the Commerce Act 1986 (which relates to 
interconnected bodies corporate), neither the commission nor any authority or Crown 
health enterprise (within the meaning of section 2 of the Health and Disability 
Services Act 1993) shall be regarded as, or as having ever been, a subsidiary of the 
Crown. 
(5) No person other than the Commerce Commission may commence any 
proceedings against an authority under section 81 or section 82 of the Commerce Act 
1986 in respect of any act, matter, or thing, that has been done or will be done before 
the 1 st day of July 1994. 
(6) Section 29 of the Health Reforms (Transitional Provisions) Act 1993 is hereby 
consequentially repealed. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
KEY CLAUSES OF THE AGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RHAs AND 
PHARMAC24 
2. APPOINTMENT 
The RHAs jointly appoint Pharmac and Pharmac agrees to act as their agent with effect 
from and including 1 July 1993 for the purposes of operating and developing the 
common national Pharmaceutical schedule in accordance with the terms and conditions 
of this Agreement. 
3. PRIMARY OBJECTIVE 
Pharmac acknowledges that the primary objective of the Crown and the RHAs in 
relation to the operation and development of the common, national Pharmaceutical 
Schedule is to obtain access by the Eligible People to safe and cost-effective quality 
medicines, therapeutic medical devices and related products or things so as to meet, 
within the amount of funding provided to the RHAs, the reasonable health needs of the 
Eligible People in accordance with the requirements of the Act and agrees that, at all 
times, it will operate and develop the common, national Pharmaceutical Schedule in 
such a manner as to meet that primary objective in accordance with the terms of the 
Funding Agreements and this Agreement. 
7. OBLIGATIONS OF PHARMAC 
Pharmac undertakes and agrees with the RHAs that, as their agent, it will : 
(a) at all times operate and develop the common, national Pharmaceutical Schedule 
in accordance with the provisions of the Funding Agreements entered into by the 
RHAs and in that regard will perform and carry out such activities and functions 
as it considers necessary for the operation and development of that Schedule 
including such consultation with such parties or persons as it deems appropriate; 
(b) comply with any directions issued by the RHAs in relation to the operation and 
development of the Pharmaceutical Schedule; 
( c) consider and, where reasonably necessary or desirable, incorporate in the 
Pharmaceutical Schedule restrictions on the prescription, or dispensing, of 
Pharmaceuticals; 
(d) publish and will use its reasonable endeavours to ensure that all parties involved 
in the prescribing and dispensing of Pharmaceuticals have reasonable access to 
copies of the Pharmaceutical Schedule and any changes to that Schedule; 
(e) not without the consent of all the RHAs undertake any business, operation or 
activity other than the operation and development of the Pharmaceutical 
Schedule in accordance with the terms of the Agreement; 
(f) not describe itself as the agent or representative of the RHAs except as expressly 
authorised in this Agreement; and 
(g) not pledge the credit of the RHAs, or any RHA, in any way whatsoever and will 
not commit itself to any expenditure beyond the budget approved by the RHAs. 
224 These clauses are as reproduced in the RMI v PHARMAC case, above n 6, 8 (HC). 
64 
APPENDIX FOUR 
WHY THE DRUGS BILL KEEPS GROWING 
There are two principle causes for steady growth in pharmaceutical expenditure. Firstly, 
the range and cost of new drugs introduced to the market has increased steadily over the 
decades.
225 
For example, the new style anti-depressants, like Prozac, cost around eight 
to 10 times more than the old style anti-depressants.226 
Secondly, most industrialised countries, such as New Zealand, have aging populations 
that require higher volumes and generally more expensive pharmaceuticals. There is a 
strong relationship between age and drug consumption. Older people are more likely to 
need medication for chronic and degenerative illnesses associated with age, such as 
heart and circulatory diseases.227 These drugs tend to be expensive, especially in 
comparison to the types of drugs most commonly used by younger people (for example 
painkillers and cold preparations, which are often generics or over-the-counter drugs) .228 
The frequency with which drugs are taken also tends to increase with age. 229 
The increasing cost of pharmaceuticals for older people is of concern for Government 
spending as New Zealand has an aging population. In the 1996 census, 11..7 per cent of 
the population were aged 65 and over. This proportion is forecasted to increase to 13 .3 
per cent by 2011 , 21.4 per cent by 2031 , and 24.9 per cent by 2051 .230 
225 The World 's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 43 . 
226 Kyle Jones, Senior Analyst, PHARMAC. Telephone conver ation, 10 September 1998. 
227 The World 's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 41. 
228 The World 's Pharmaceutical Industries, above n 165, 43 . 
229 For example, a German study revealed that 55% of people over 45 take drugs more than once per 
week, compared to only 15% of people aged between 14 and 44. The World 's Pharmaceutical Industries, 
above n 165, 43 . 
230 Statistics New Zealand Aging and Retirement in New Zealand (August 1997) 40. 
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